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EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  
The last decades the number of international Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA) has increased 
dramatically. At the same time the loss of biodiversity has accelerated. The effectiveness of these agreements 
has therefore been questioned. On the other side, they have been recognised to play an important part in the 
process of bringing together and facilitating cooperation between states, and influence government policy and 
practice in fields related to conservation of biodiversity. 
Cooperation, along with coordination, is one of the key aspects to halt the loss of biodiversity. This is 
especially true in the field of transboundary resources, such as migratory species, where no state single 
handed effectively can manage these resources. However, as shown in this thesis, even though cooperation 
would be a great success, there is no guarantee that such cooperation would have a positive impact on the 
conservation of biological diversity. 
This thesis is a review and analysis of the effectiveness of biodiversity-related treaties. It gives a deeper 
insight in various treaties and the different approaches they use to contribute to the conservation of 
biodiversity. The purpose of this review was to compare these approaches with the approach used by the 
Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), in order to provide 
proposals to UNEP/CMS Secretariat to consider to increase their contribution to the preservation of the 
????????????????????, while fulfilling the objectives of the convention. 
A challenge this thesis encountered was the difficulty of comparing CMS with other biodiversity-related 
treaties. This was due largely to difference in structure and approach to the object. While most biodiversity-
related treaties contribute to the conservation of biodiversity through its own text, the primary purpose of 
CMS is to serve as a breeding ground where other agreements may be entered into and spun off. 
In recent years, CMS has not been focused on the legally binding agreements, but on non-legally binding 
agreements, Memorandum of Understanding. As a result, these agreements are included in this thesis. 
This thesis and its conclusion is that if the legal text itself can not effectively contribute to the conservation of 
biodiversity, then the actions taken as a result of this text can neither make an effective contribution. 
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PART  1  -­‐  INTRODUCTION  1 BACKGROUND  
  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
grandchildren,  from  the  threat  of  living  on  a  planet  irredeemably  spoilt  by  human  
activities,  and  whose  resources  would  no  longer  b??????????????????????????????1  
The concern over the status of the environment, and the affect its deterioration ultimately will have 
on humanity, are increasingly present in the contemporary international discourse regarding 
natural resources. As a result of decades with unlimited unsustainable development mankind as a 
whole are now faced with the side effect of this development,2 and in order for humanity to 
continually be able to rely on the ecosystem services, they have come to take for granted, there is a 
need to change this unsustainable development to sustainable development. 
To address the problems that humanity was facing entering a new millennium, such as 
development and other acute problems,3 the United Nations held a high-level meeting in 
September 2000, Millennium Summit.4 The summit gathered the majority of the world leaders and 
resulted in the Millennium Declaration5 containing the Millennium Goals.6 These targets where 
converted into eight specific targets, most with a sunset of 2015.7 In relation to biodiversity the 
millennium declaration calls on states to show prudence in the management of biodiversity in 
accordance with the precepts of sustainable development.8 The declaration also urged that 
sustainable development should be implemented at all levels of government and reflected in 
programs and policies, to stop the loss of environmental resources.9 
To meet the challenge of an accelerating loss of biodiversity, the parties to the Convention of 
Biological Diversity (CBD)10 adopted in 2002 a strategic plan.11 The strategic plan set a target to 
                                                                                                                                                
1 UN doc. A/RES/55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, 55th Session, 8th Plenary 
meeting, 8 September 2000, para. 21.  
2 See e.g. UN doc. A/56/326, Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration, particularly paras. 164-193.  
3 See UN doc. A/53/948/Add.1, Report of the Secretary-General, The Millennium assemble of the United 
Nations: thematic framework for the Millennium Summit.  
4 See UN doc. A/RES/53/202, A/RES/53/239, A/RES/54/254, A/RES/54/261, A/RES/54/281.  
5 UN doc. A/RES/55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration. GA Res. 55/2, 55th Session, 8th Plenary 
meeting, 8 September 2000.  
6 See UN doc. A/56/326, Report of the Secretary-General - Road map towards the implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Op. cit., supra footnote 1.  
9 Op cit., supra footnote 2, Annex: Millennium Development Goals.  
10 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992) EIF 29 December 1993, 
U.N.T.S. vol. 1760, p. 70 [hereinafter CBD].  
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halt the rate of which biological resources where being depleted, i.e. not to halt the loos of 
biodiversity.12 To achieve this target the parties committed themselves to implement CBD in such 
a manner so ???significant reduction of the current rate of biological loss at the global, regional and 
national level? would take place. The sunset for the goal was set to 2010. 
In 2010 it was only confirmed what was known years before,13 the goal was far from achieved. 
The loss of biodiversity was and still is declining,14 arguable as a result of inadequate 
management.15 The decline also arguable takes ???? ???????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????
tipping point, where the service of the eco-system, as provided so far, will no longer be provided 
to humanity.16 
Despite consensus in the international community over the unsustainability of current 
development,17 which still exceeding the carrying capacity18 of the Earth????????????, seemingly 
simple goal as the CBD 2010 biodiversity goal is still hard to reach. The failure to reach such 
goals can not be seen as anything but a collective failure of the international community.19 
The fragmented international concern over the human environment, were brought together in 1972 
in Stockholm, Sweden,20 where United Nations in response to the invitation of the Swedish 
government held an international Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), also known 
as the Stockholm Conference. This conference was the first international conference of its kind. It 
represents the big step towards full recognition over the side effects of human development, as 
well as the recognition over the need to take these side effects into account in future 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
11 See Decision VI/26, Annex 1, para. 11, CBD/COP-6. In October 2011 a new plan was adopted for the year 
2011-2020. See decision X/2, CBD-COP 10.  
12 Id., Decision VI/26.  
13 See inter alia Global Diversity Outlook 2 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2006) 
(GBO-2); and Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: Ecosystem and Human Well-Being: Wetlands and 
Water. Synthesis (Washington, DC. 2005).  
14 See, inter alia, Global Diversity Outlook 3 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010) 
(GBO-3); and The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011 (New York: 2011).  
15 See, inter alia, GBO-3; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: Ecosystem and Human Well-Being: 
Wetlands and Water. Synthesis (Washington: 2005); and The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011 
(New York: 2010).  
16 Ibid.  
17 Decleris, M., The Law of Sustainable Development: General Principles, A report for the European 
Commission (Brussels: 2000), p. 45.  
18 See, e.g., Rockström, et al.?? ??????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ????? ?????????? ?????? ???? ??????????
Ecology and Society (2009) No.14 (2):32; Available at <www.ecologyandsociety.orf/vol14/iss2/art32/>.  
19 1 October 2011 CBS had 193 parties, covering all members of the United Nations and almost all the 
?????????????endent countries.  
20 See, inter alia, Lowenfeld, A.F., International Economical Law (2nd ed.) (Oxford: 2008), pp. 377-381.; 
and Lausche, B.J., Weaving a Web of Environmental Law (Bonn: 2008), pp. 161-167.  
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development.21 As a result, the principle of responsibility to protect and responsibility to improve 
where recognised.22 
The Stockholm Conference resulted in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment.23 This declaration contains 26 principles to be considered in future 
development. To facilitate the implementation of the declaration the Action Plan for the Human 
Environment24 was adopted25 (hereinafter Action Plan). The Action Plan contains actions as well 
as recommendations divided into three main areas; (1) Environmental Assessment, highlighting the 
importance of research, monitoring and evaluating the status of the environment; (2) 
Environmental Management, to address the need of cooperation between states; and (3) 
Supporting Measures, which includes measures to support activities taken in the other two areas.26 
 
All these areas are to some extent incorporated in contemporary biodiversity-related conventions, 
often by setting goals, methods of monitoring and cooperation. 
Recommendation 32 of the action plan addresses natural resources living in international waters as 
well as species migrating between areas of jurisdiction. The purpose of this recommendation is to 
facilitate a comprehensive planning that includes conservation and improvement of the human 
environment, where the human side-effects are taken into account, for the benefit of present and 
                                                                                                                                                
21 UN doc. A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 
1972 (Stockholm Conference), adopted 16 June 1972. See Part 1, Section I (6).  
22 Ibid., Principle 1, part 1, chapter 1, section II.  
23 See, supra footnote 21.  
24 Ibid., chapter II.  
25 Ibid., part 1, chapter XI-Xii, paras. 339-341.  
26 Ibid., Part 1, Chapter II (A).  
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future generations.27 As a result agreements that cover these areas were proposed, where the focus 
of such agreements should be on conservation.28 As a result, the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) was established in 1972,29 with a function to facilitate international 
cooperation by bringing states together to conclude agreements addressing environmental issues.30 
In contrast to the exponential growth of international multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), as a result of the increasing concern over the human environment,31 the deterioration of 
the E????????????????????????????will continue through this century, unless it is obstructed.32  
The failure to effectively address this degradation can not be attributed a specific MEA. It rather 
confirms the growing concern about the effectiveness of all environmental agreements to live up 
to their purpose and promise.33 This is alarming because the current rate of biodiversity loss is 
already beyond the planetary boundaries.34 
Despite more than 40 years of international concern over the human environment, and an ever-
expanding portfolio of analysis of their effectiveness, there still exists a need for further analysis 
of existing conventions, particularly with regard to the method used by them to address the 
preservation of the ??????? biological diversity. Thus, this outlines the context of this thesis.  2 PURPOSE  AND  QUESTIONS  
If MEAs are recognised as the principal structure that is supposed to govern and control states 
conduct relating to the conservation of biodiversity, there is clearly some doubt on their 
effectiveness.35 On the other hand, they have been shown to play an important role in influencing 
                                                                                                                                                
27 Id, supra footnote 24.  
28 Id.  
29 UN doc. A/RES/2997(XXVII), Institutional and financial arrangements for international environmental 
co-operation GA Res 2997, 27th Session, 2112th Plenary meeting, 15 December 1972.  
30 Ibid.  
31 See Meyer, et al.,  ?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
World Environmental Regime, 1870-??????? International Organization (1997) Autumn, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 
623-651.  
32 See The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (UN DESA) (New York: 2010), particularly 2:55.; 
Available at <www.unfpa.org/public/home/publications>  
33 See, e.g., inter alia?? ??????????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ???? ????? ???????? ?????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Review of European 
Community & International Law, (RECIEL) 19 (2); Mangel. M., et al., ???????????????? ????????????????????
???????????????????????Ecological Society of America (ESA) Ecological Applications,(1996) May, vol.6, no. 
2.; and Meyer, supra footnote 20.  
34 See Rockström, supra footnote 18.  
35 See, e.g., inter alia, Jóhannsdóttir, et al.; Mangle; and Meyer et.al., supra footnote 33.  
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policy and practices in these states.36 In addition, their contribution to international conservation 
cooperation can not be underestimated.37 
The effectiveness of MEA can also be questioned in relation to the principle of Sustainable 
Development. So far, development can not be seen as sustainable, because development so far has 
taken place at a level where the resources used exceeds the rate at which they are replaced.38 As a 
result, the question may be if the MEAs effectively contribute to the change in direction, from 
unsustainable development to sustainable development.39 
The aim of this study is at first to analyse the effectiveness of existing biodiversity-related MEAs 
by asking: 
? How does the design of a convention text affect;  
o What conservation measures that are taken; and 
o What impact it can have on the E???????????????????????????? 
? What is the role of the Conference of the Parties (COP);  
o As regards to interpretation of the meaning of the text of the convention: and  
o Does this interpretation affect the existence of obligation? 
The questions above will help to get a deeper understanding in three areas. The first question gives 
us a deeper insight of the role of the convention text play in the decision-making process regarding 
what measures should be taken in order to get adequate conservation. It also shows how these 
decisions in turn can affect the conservation status of the E?????? biodiversity. The second question 
will give an insight into the interconnection between the text of the convention and COP-
decisions. To understand this interconnection is important as the text of the convention seldom 
gives all the answers. 
                                                                                                                                                
36 See, e.g., Meyer, J.W., et al., pp. 646-647 et passim, supra footnote 31.  
37 ?????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????94) Oxford Economic 
Paper, New Series, Vol. 46, Special Issue on Environmental Economics. October, at pp. 891-892 et passim.  
38 See Decleris supra footnote17.  
39 This thesis adopts the definition of sustainable development as it is definition through Brundtland report, 
infra note 68.  
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Secondly this thesis compares the covered MEAs with the Bonn Convention on the Conservation 
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS),40 by asking: 
? What approach does CMS take when addressing conservation in comparison with other 
MEAs? 
The difficulty in comparing CMS with different MEAs is based on difference in scope, and 
approach to conservation. CMS for example is concluded for conservation of migratory species, 
whereas the Ramsar convention is concluded for the conservation of wetlands. The delimitation of 
this study, described below, will facilitate this process of comparison. This comparison was made 
possible by analysing special features in each MEA. In the context of this thesis special feature is 
characteristics of each MEA which is unique in comparison with other MEAs. 
Based on the above analyses this thesis will give proposals to UNEP/CMS Secretariat by asking: 
? What steps can CMS take to: 
o Improve their contribution to the preservation of the E?????? biodiversity; 
o Contribute to the conservation of the E??????? ?????????????while meeting their 
goals and objectives of the Convention; and 
o Contribute to a sustainable development. 
The questions above are based on the analysis done by this thesis. In these proposals the often 
limited financial situations that most MEA secretariats are dealing with have been considered. 
Thus most of the proposals would be possible to implement without major financial investment. 3 DELIMITATION  
To achieve the aim of this thesis delimitation was necessary. The first delimitation follows the 
above context, which delimits the scope of this thesis to include only biodiversity-related 
agreements. To mark a convention as biodiversity-related this thesis uses the same label that is 
used by UNEP.41 Along with these agreements, other conventions of particular importance for the 
conservation of biodiversity where included. The concept of biodiversity-related is used as a 
reference to all of the covered agreements. Along with these agreements this thesis covers decision 
from decision-making authorities of these conventions. 
                                                                                                                                                
40 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn, June 23 1979) EIF 1 
November 1983. U.N.T.S. vol. 1651, p. 333 (also known as the Bonn Convention) [hereinafter CMS].  
41 See <www.unep.org/dec/links/index.html>.  
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The conventions covered in this thesis are: (1) CMS;42 (2) CBD;43 (3) the Cartagena protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity44 (the Cartagena protocol); (4) the Nagoya ? 
Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena protocol on 
Biosafety45(the Supplementary Nagoya protocol; (5) The Convention Concerning the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage46 (WHC); (6) The Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources47 (CCAMLR); and (7) the Convention of Wetlands of 
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat48 (Ramsar). 
Further delimitations was made by disregarding the following conventions: (a) The United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea,49 (UNCLOS); (b) The United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks;50 (c) The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES);51 and (d) The Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement 
Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna52 (Lusaka Agreement). 
All these conventions have special ways to approach conservation management, which makes 
them stand out from other biodiversity-related agreements. The first two are specialized in dealing 
with issues relating to the sea. They govern rights and obligations closely connected to the 
sovereignty of the state. Their strategy and structure are not common in the field of biodiversity 
                                                                                                                                                
42 See CMS, supra footnote 40.  
43 See CBD, supra footnote 10.  
44 Cartagena protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (the Cartagena protocol) 
(Montreal, 29 January 2000). EIF 11 September 2003. U.N.T.S vol. 2226, p.208 [hereinafter Cartagena 
protocol].  
45 Nagoya ? Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena protocol on 
Biosafety (the Supplementary Nagoya protocol) (Nagoya, 15 October 2010). Not yet in force, as of 20 July 
there are 24 out of 40 signatories [hereinafter supplementary Nagoya protocol].  
46 The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage 
Convention) (Paris, 16 November 1972) EIF 17 December 1975. U.N.T.S. vol. 1037 [hereinafter WHC].  
47 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) (Canberra, 20 May 
1980) EIF 7 April 1982. U.N.T.S. vol. 1329 [hereinafter CCAMLR].  
48 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar 
Convention) (Ramsar, 2 February 1971) EIF 21 December 1975. U.N.T.S. No. 996. As amended by the Paris 
Protocol (Paris, 3 December 1982) U.N.T.S No.1473, and Regina amendments (Regina 28 May 1987) 
U.N.T.S No. 1824 [hereinafter Ramsar].  
49 United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982) EIF 16 November 1994. 
U.N.T.S vol. 1833 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  
50 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (New York, 4 August 1995) EIF 11 December 2001. U.N.T.S. vol. 
2167.  
51Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) (Washington, 
3 Mars 1973) EIF 1 July 1975. U.N.T.S. vol. 993.  
52 Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Flora and 
Fauna (Lusaka Agreement) (Lusaka, 8 September 1994). EIF 10 December 1996. U.N.T.S. vol. 1950.  
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conservation and this makes them unique in the flora of conventions dealing with biodiversity. The 
two latter conventions do not address the conservation of biodiversity per se. Their scope is more 
connected to the negative effect that international trade can have on the survival of wild animals 
and plants. Thus, they are more focused on trade than conservation. As a result of the above, 
disregarding these instrument do not have a negative effect on the final outcome of this thesis. 
Further more, as mentioned above, the covered MEAs vary greatly. As a result, there was a need 
for further delimitations to facilitate the process of comparison. For this reason limitation on which 
aspects of each MEA covered where needed. This thesis focus on special features, which as 
described above are characteristics of each MEA which makes it unique compared to other. The 
different aspects covered by this thesis are: (I) Obligations; (II); Feedback systems; (III) 
Enforcement; (IV) Decision-making; (V) Dispute Settlement; and (VI) Liability. 
Implementation, Obligation and Feedback-system are essential aspects of conservation 
management. Implementation relates to actions parties shall to take in order to fulfil obligations 
under the signed convention. Obligations relate to actions the parties have committed themselves 
to take as a result of the signing. Submission of reports could be such an obligation, unless it is 
voluntary. If parties only should submit reports, reporting is not in the eyes of this study 
considered as an obligation.  
As a result of the cooperative and self-enforcement structure of international conventions,53 the 
submission of reports plays an important role in the Feedback-system. The function of a Feedback-
system is primarily a mean to monitor the implementation of obligations under the convention, in 
order to evaluate whether the convention is effective or not.54 
To return to the obligations, this study analyzed whether there are any obligations for parties as a 
result of signing. To evaluate the existence of obligation this thesis read the text of the convention 
in conjunction with COP decisions and applicable sources of international law.55 Taking special 
regards to core principles of sustainable development, such as equity.56 
Enforcement refers to the existents of formal enforcement and non-compliance procedure. These 
procedures shall not be confused with non-compliance mechanisms, such as technical and 
                                                                                                                                                
53 Louka, E., International Environmental Law - Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order (Cambridge: 
2006), p. 73.  
54 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????New Zealand Journal 
of Environmental Law, vol. 11, pp. 181-186.  
55 See Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, EIF 24 October 1945, 
U.N.T.S. XVI. [hereinafter S.I.C.J.].   
56 Harris, D.J., Cases and Materials on International Law (6th ed.) (London: 2004), pp.48-50.   
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financial assistance. The term enforcement, as used in this thesis, includes any instruments of 
pressure to increase compliance. The reason for including enforcement is based on the following 
assumption; if there is no enforcement the implementation cost will always exceed the benefit, and 
therefore result in a lower level of compliance.57 This will be further clarified below when dealing 
with the theory of implementation deficit; 
Decision Making. The absence of a supranational structure within the international community 
makes it important to understand the role that the decision-making authority of each convention. 
As a result, decision-making process will be described in close relation to these decisions. 
Dispute Settlement refers to how disputes occurring as a result of different interpretation of the 
convention, should be resolved. Dispute settlement procedures are enforcement procedures; 
however, they are seldom used in conflicts over biodiversity-related treaties. Nevertheless, this 
aspect was included in this study as dispute settlement procedures play an important role in 
clarifying responsibilities. 
Liability concerns the extent to which the signer may be liable under the convention. 
Responsibility for non-compliance or breaches is difficult to negotiate. A good example of a 
biodiversity-related convention containing such a liability would be the UNCLOS. Liability may, 
however, arise as a result of international principles, such as the polluter pays principle.58 
Further delimitation of this thesis will take place as a result of the definition of the term efficiency. 3.1 EFFICIENCY  
The efficiency of an object is measured by analysing the object in relation to the purpose for which 
the analyses takes place. Therefore, the purpose of the analyses must be clarified, whether the 
purpose is to analyse the effectiveness of the measures taken or to analyse the effectiveness of the 
method used in the convention and their impact of the measures taken. This section will therefore 
define the purpose of the analyses by defining the concept of efficiency used in this thesis. 
A distinction must be made between regime effectiveness and regime rules effectiveness. 
Analysing the efficiency is usually applied as a concept for analysing the effectiveness of the 
regime itself, the regime effectiveness. This thesis does not analyse effectiveness of the regime and 
its contribution to the conservation status of E???????????????????. This thesis narrows the analyses 
                                                                                                                                                
57 See; e.g., Louka, E. p. 73 supra footnote 53.  
58 UN doc. A/CONF.151/26 (VOL.I), Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro (UNCED), 3-14 June 1992, Annex 1: Rio-declaration on Environment and 
Development, principle 16.  
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of effectiveness to the approach used in the texts of a convention to address the conservation of 
biodiversity. Therefore, this dissertation will analyse the effectiveness of the approach used, i.e. 
regime rules efficiency. As a result, this thesis does not analyse the measured taken by individual 
signatories, in order to fulfil treaty obligations.  
The narrow approach is used as an effective fulfilment of the obligations under a treaty is no 
guarantee of effectiveness in meeting the goals and objectives of a treaty.59 Meanwhile, if the 
treaty itself is not built for durability, there is a risk of further deviation from the overall objective 
of the treaty when it is implemented by the signatory States. The successful implementation of 
such obligations would thus only give the appearance of Phantom of motion in the right 
direction.60 
To return to the distinction between regime effectiveness (RE) and regime rules efficiency (RRE), 
it may at first glance seem as a trivial matter. This is not the case. A RE approach would 
requirement to set a lower- and an upperbound in order to get an axis, where the effectiveness of 
the regime can be placed.61 As a result, more emphasis must be placed on important variables. 
This is particularly the case when setting the lowerbound, as a mistake here will automatically 
reflect the results of the analyses of the effectiveness of the regime.62 This is especially true in the 
field of environmental where there is seldom a time lag between actions and results to be 
expected.63 As a result, there are a higher requirement in an RE approach for reliable scientific 
data, to get an accurate result.64 
This is not the case in an RRE approach. In this approach there is no requirement to set a 
lowerbound. Thus, the need for scientific data is not as high. As follows, an RRE approach would 
                                                                                                                                                
59 See, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, (2000) October, vol. 44, no. 5, pp.  633-635.  
60 Id.  
61 The lower bound would be the state of the matter before the regime was adopted, i.e. the state of nature 
before a treaty was implemented. It follows, in order to set this bound there is a need to take into account 
actions which have already taken place, i.e. before the actions as a result of the signed convention was taken, 
but whose effect will be visible years or decades later. See Helm, C. and Sprintz, D., Ibid., particularly  
pp.630-652.  
62 The demand for scientific data become apparent when setting the lowerbound as there is a need to take 
into account multiple variables, which can be already implemented environmental policies, or even war and 
political changes, whose effects has not been apparent because of the response delay. Their effect on the 
environment have to be included in order to get an accurate lowerbound in order be able to attribute the right 
contribution of the MEA. . See Helm, C. and Sprintz, D., supra footnote 59, particularly  pp.630-637.  
63 See Helm, C. and Sprintz, D., supra footnote 59, particularly  pp.630-652.  
64 Ibid.  
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be more suitable for a theoretical analysis. However, there is still a prerequisite for an upperbound, 
either of which can be a ???????????????????????????.?65  
As mentioned above, such a goal can be an overarching goal. These types of goals are not concern 
with specific goals, such as the conservation objective in the Agreement on the Conservation of 
Gorillas and their Habitats (Gorilla Agreement),66 but focuses on a primary target to be achieved in 
a perfect regime. However, it is important that this primary goal is reflected in the instruments 
concluded for its purpose.67  
As a result of the above, this thesis analyse the efficiency of the approach used in the design of the 
conventions, rather than the effectiveness of conventions themselves. Therefore, this thesis will 
not be required to set a lowerbound. As an upperbound this thesis applies the principle of 
sustainable development.68 4 METHODOLOGY  AND  APPROACH  
To achieve the aim of this thesis it analyzed the approach used in the covered instruments to 
address the conservation of biodiversity, by focusing on specific aspects of each MEA. In order to 
analyze the meaning of the text of the conventions, decisions from decision-making bodies have 
been considered, as well as international documents, legal texts and other relevant literature. 
This thesis has been carried out in four phases, (1) Outline of the theoretical framework, (2) 
Collect information on the subject, (3) Analysis the collected information, (4) Make concrete 
proposals for UNEP/CMS Secretariat to take into consideration to enhance their contribution to 
the preservation of the E??????? ????????????, awhile meeting the purpose and objectives of the 
Convention. As a result, this thesis is divided into the following parts. 
                                                                                                                                                
65 ??????????? ?? ????????? ?????????????? ?????? ?????? ???????????????????????? ????? ?? ????????? ????????????? ????
example a reduction of percentage (of biodiversity losses). Due to the existence of endogenous problems, 
such a target could give misleading results of regime effectiveness. On the other hand, vague broad 
institutional goals, such as sustainable development, are more difficult to use as an upperbound. For this 
purpose the use of threshold targets is required. A good example of such a threshold target would be a Flim 
?????????? ????????????? ??? ?? ???????????? ??????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????? inter 
alia, Helm, C. and Sprintz, D, supra footnote 59; and European Fisheries Law - From Promotion to 
Management till Markus (Groningen:2009) pp. 72-75.  
66 Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats (Gorilla Agreement). Paris, 26 October 
2007, in force 1 June 2008. U.N.T.S No. 2544 [hereinafter Gorilla Agreement], article II.  
67 Helm, C. and Sprintz, D., supra footnote 59, pp.632-633.  
68. See UN doc. A/42/427 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 4 
August 1987, (Brundtland Report), Annex 1: Summary of Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental 
Protection and Sustainable Development Adopted by the WCED Experts Group on Environmental Law, 
chapter 2, paras. 55-64. Where the report outlines the need to conserve the earths natural resources as a part 
of the concept of sustainable development.  
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The first part of this thesis, (Part 1 Introduction) contains, (I) Background to the topic. In this 
section, the history and context of biodiversity-related MEAs is introduced, which in turn 
establishes the framework. (II) Purpose and questions. The aim of the work in this thesis is 
described with specific questions to answer, (III) Delimitation. In order to clarify the scope of the 
thesis, and to facilitate the analysis process this section describes the boundaries, (VI) Efficiency is 
defined here as used in this thesis; (V) Methodology and Approach. This section describes the 
methods and approach in this thesis: and (IV) Theoretical Approach which defined the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, and consists of the following parts, (a) the environmental perspective, (b) 
Three-Filter Theory, (c) Operationalisation, and (d) the implementation deficit. 
The Second part, (Part 2, Multilateral Biodiversity-Related Treaties) contains an analysis of the 
covered conventions. The approach used when analyzing the conventions is an integrated 
approach69 outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.70 According to this 
view, a ???????? ????????? ???????????? ???????? ?????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????? ??????
given to the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????71 
Part three, (Part 3, Analysis, Summary and Recommendations) provides an analysis of the 
approach CMS uses for the conservation of migratory species. This part also contains proposals 
for UNEP/CMS Secretariat to consider for the benefit of their contribution to the preservation of 
the E???????????????????, while meeting the purpose and objective of the convention. 5 THEORETICAL  APPROACH  
The deteriorating ecosystem is debatable a combination of the none-adoptive rules of human and 
non-linear structure7 2  of nature.73 Until the 1970s, the prevailing approached in management of 
resource was to see the ecosystem as a deterministic and homeostatic structure. As a result, only a 
few components of scientific information were regarded when calculating the maximum 
                                                                                                                                                
69 There are arguably three ways in international law to interpreting a treaty. The objective approach, where 
a treaty is interpretation solely based on the wording. The Subjective approach, where the parties intention is 
giving precedence. The teleological approach, frequently used by the European court of Justice, where the 
aim of the treaty and the treaty objectives are the main objects. See Wallace, R.M.M. and Martin-Ortega, O., 
International Law (6 ed.) (London: 2009), pp. 275-277.  
70 Article 31, Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969) EIF 27 January 1980. U.N.T.S Vol. 
1155, p.331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  
71 Article 31, Vienna Convention.  
72 Westerlund defines a nonlinear effect as something not inline with consents emissions but appears 
suddenly when a threshold is exceeded. Westerlund, S., En Hållbar Rättsordning - rättsvetenskapliga 
Paradigm och tankevändor (Uppsala, 1997) p. 50.  
73 Mangel. M., et al., Supra footnote 33.  
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sustainable yield.74 These few components were mainly biological data on the species to be 
harvested, as well as information of their ecosystem.75 Consequently, the larger picture was 
unregocnized. 5.1.1  ENVIRONMENTAL  PERSPECTIVE  
This thesis adopts an environmental perspective76 when analyzing the covered documents. The 
environmental perspective allows the analyses to take a larger picture into account when analyzing 
legislations and legal texts. Thus, this perspective differs from a traditional legal perspective. At 
the same time it allows the object to be analyzed from a starting point outside the law. To allow 
the analyzer to take into account other aspects that are not clearly fit within the boundaries of the 
traditional justice system, such as the loss of biodiversity.77 An analyze according to a traditional 
legal method would be restricted to only consider only traditional sources of international law78 
and required to stay within the limits of the judicial system when analyzing. In other words, a 
traditional method in analyze the biodiversity-related agreements would not be sufficient if the 
goal is to analyse the legal text and its importance for biodiversity.79 This is the result of the 
requirement of this analysis to take into account aspects that exist outside the law itself,80 such as 
probabilistic and multi-casual nature of the ecosystem.81 
As mentioned above, the deterioration of the ecosystem is the result of the two legal systems 
operating in the same area, the human justice and the law of nature. Although decomposition 
occurs as a result of human actions, guided by human laws, the results are largely only visible 
outside the legal system. The matter is further complicated by the traditional legal system which, 
debatably, can not handling this.82 Human rules can never change the behaviour of the E???????
ecosystems83 and people still do not have the power to manage it. As a logical conclusion, the 
human rules must adopt to fit within the elasticity of the law of nature, as human laws with nature 
as an addressee would be a vacuous paper product.84 
                                                                                                                                                
74 Ibid., pp. 355-357.  
75 Id.  
76 Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, pp. 23-41.   
77 Ibid., pp.  25-27.  
78 Op. cit., supra footnote 55.  
79 See Decleris, supra note 17, pp. 38-48.  
80 Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, pp. 25-27.  
81 See, inter alia, Westerlund 1997, Ibid., pp. 142-144; and Mangel. M., et al., supra footnote 33, pp. 355-
357.  
82 See Decleris, supra footnote 17, pp. 38-48.  
83 Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, pp. 53.  
84 Mangel. M., et al., supra footnote 33, pp. 346-347.  
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As mentioned above, this thesis adopts the principle of sustainable development as an overarching 
goal for all biodiversity-related instruments.85 Sustainable development is largely defined from an 
anthropocentric point of view,86 and is arguable situated outside the law.87 While a traditional legal 
method would allow such an overarching goal, this approach would be more focus on the 
definition of the term, and whether it has any legally binding status, and contains obligations and 
rights. The argument against any legal obligations would be amongst other, the non-existent 
consensus on the definition of the principle. According to Decleris the definition of sustainable 
development is to general to be able to fulfil the demands for a legal concept, it rather contains 
ethnical obligations than higher mortal once.88 This would also be consistent with by Bosselman.89 
On the other hand, according to I.C.J. Vice-president Weeremantry sustainable development is 
more a principle of normative values than just a concept, and is part of contemporary international 
law. In his separate opinion in the case concerning theGa???????-Nagymaros project, is the 
principle of sustainable development ?part of modern international law by reason not only of its 
inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general acceptance by the global 
???????????90 
The original definition of sustainable development in the Brundtland report,91 confirmed in the Rio 
declaration,92 and the report of the World Summit on sustainable Development,93 reads as follows: 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? t  without  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 94  
Two important aspects in this definition will be addressed. 
The first aspect contains the idea of limitations imposed by states through technology and its social 
structure, including the structure of the judicial system, which may prevent future generations to 
                                                                                                                                                
85In spite or regarding sustainable development as an overall target Westerlunds believes that in order to 
define sustainable development as a principle this would only be possible as long as the word it self does not 
have an impact on the ability for the future generations to fulfil their goals. See Westerlund, supra footnote 
72, pp. 36-42.   
86 See UNCED, principle 1, supra footnote 58.  
87 See, e.g., Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, p.167.  
88 Decleris, supra footnote 17, pp. 44-49.  
89 ???????????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????
Sustainability, 2, pp. 2424-2448; available at <http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/2/8/2424/>.  
90 See, C????????????????????????????-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement, 25 September 
1997, I.C.J. report 1997, particularly the separate opinion of Vice-president Weeremantry.  
91 See the Brundtland report, supra footnote 68.  
92 See the Rio-declaration, supra footnote 58.  
93 UN doc. A/CONF.199/20. Report of the World Summit on sustainable development, Johannesburg, South 
Africa 26 August-4 September 2002.   
94See the Brundtland Report, supra footnote 68, Annex 1: Summary of Proposed Legal Principles for 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, Adopted by the WCED Experts Group on 
Environmental Law, chapter 2 (1).  
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meet their needs.95 As a result, these systems must change for development to shift from an 
unsustainable development to sustainable development.96 
The second aspect of the definition include the principle of equity, both inter-generation equity 
and intra-generation equity.97 Equity is a fundamental principle of the principle of sustainable 
development. As a result sustainable development can not be considered sustainable if future 
generation do not have access to resources to satisfy their needs, as they choose to define them.98 
This would also be relevant for the present generation. Thus, every living generation has the 
obligations to take this into account. The obligation of each generation is to take into account the 
long-lasting effect when they exercising their right to use resource available, so there will be a 
base of resources for future generation. As a result, the sustainability part of the concept of 
sustainable development are not met, if not the principle of equity is taken into account. 
The definition in the Brundtland report has been seen as incomplete, containing a week 
sustainability.99 This is the case, this definition is made from an anthropocentric point of view and 
for development to be sustainable development through its definition, then development must take 
place within the boundaries of the Earth????????????? and such a development would be labelled a 
strong sustainability.100 As a result, the text of the law dealing with environmental issues must not 
only be able to handle the probabilistic and multi-casual structure of nature, but also inter- and 
intra-generation equity to be regarded as a legislation inline with sustainable development.101 It 
follows from this approach that legal texts can not be renegotiating-proof.102 Legal text must be in 
a constant state of reassessment based on feedback, which means that the legal texts can adopt and 
develop. This re-evaluation and the emergence of legal text must be done even though it is 
difficult to agree when renegotiating them.103 
                                                                                                                                                
95 Id.  
96 See, inter alia, Westerlund, supra footnote 72, pp. 148-??????????????????????????????????????????????????
development of envir????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ???????????? ????????????? ???????
Ympäristöjuridiika 2, particularly pp. 30-33.  
97 See; e.g., inter alia, the Brundtland Report, supra footnote 68: and Rio declaration, supra footnote 58, 
Annex 1, principle 3.  
98 See; e.g., inter alia, Cordonire S., M-C., Ashfaq, K., Sustainable development Law ? Principles, practice 
and prospects, (2 ed.) (Oxford: 2005), pp. 99-100; and Chapter1.1, Swedish Environment Act (1998:808), 
which clearly outlines the obligation connected to the right to use the natures resources.  
99 See Bosselmann, supra footnote 89, particularly section 5.2.  
100 Id.  
101 Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, pp. 37-39.  
102 Other however, argues that self-enforcing international environmental agreements must be renegotiation-
proof; however this is connected to the theory of infinitely credible punishment. See Barrett supra footnote 
37, pp. 878-880 et passim.  
103 This is the most common response you will get when suggesting changes to an international instrument. 
This stance appears to be based on the ???????????? ??????????????? ??? ????????????? ??????????????????????????
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The need for re-evaluation is not based on each ???????????? obligations towards future once, but 
based on the need for a progressive transform of the judiciary, as well as these that control 
structure of society at large.104 Development in the nineteen century is debatable a result of such 
changes.105 For these changes to take place once more there is now a need for change in approach 
at the international level. This is the logical consequence of a contemporary world where national 
legislations to a higher degree reflects international law and signed treaties.106 
It is not impossible to make changes within the current legal system to include the responsibility to 
preserve nature and simultaneously transfer it unspoiled to the future, for the benefit of future 
generation.107 The Icelandic Act on Nature Conservation108 is an example where man?? relation to 
nature has been regulated. According to the purpose of the legislation actions ?????????????????????
the biosphere nor the geosphere,?? it should also ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????? ????? ??????????
nature can develop according to its own laws and ensuring conservation of its exceptional 
historical aspects.?109 The problem is not to put these kinds of legislation in place, but how the 
laws are implemented and enforced.110 
As a result, applying a traditional legal perspective when analyzing the subject will not sufficient, 
it would have more of a narrative effect on the analysis. Thus an environmental perspective would 
be more appropriate for this thesis. 5.1.2  THREE-­‐FILTER  THEORY  
The three-filter theory is a theory about three barriers in place between the target and the end 
result, with a function to filter out unwanted behaviour.111 If the filters are successive to fulfil its 
function the end-result will be inline with the target.112 According to the theory, the first filter 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
agreement then open up an old one for renegotiation, This is probably a result of the fear of being over 
flooded with suggestions and argument which makes it hard for the treaty leave the ground. Bearing in mind 
the time consuming negotiation of UNCLOS this fear may be true, at least in case of highly politicised 
agreements. This is arguable the case why we see the patchwork in the area of environmental agreements. 
Arguable this approach will increase implementation deficit.  
104 See the Brundtland Report, supra footnote 68, Annex 1, chapter 2 (3).  
105 According to Westerlunds the development we saw in the past was the result of re-evaluation and 
changes in the legal system and law at its time. See Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, pp.125-140.    
106 Decleris, supra footnote 17, pp. 38-49 et passim.  
107 Se,; e.g., Westerlund 1997, supra note 78, p.38.  
108 Lög um náttúruvernd, 44/1999; English version available at 
 <http://english.ust.is/media/log/Act_on_nature_conservation.pdf >, accessed 09.04, 11 July 2011. 
109 Ibid., Article 1.  
110 See, e.g., Westerlund who recognizes the possibility to have substantive rules, such as rules prohibits 
actions which would have a deteriorating effect on the biodiversity. He sees, however, this not as a problem, 
the problem appear within the legal system when these rules are to be implemented into reality and how to 
enforce them. See Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 78, pp. 37-39.  
111 Westerlund 1997, Supra footnote 78, pp. 13-22.  
112 Disregarding the theory of implementation deficits.  
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consists of ethic and moral considerations. These two concepts are to prevent us from acting in 
contrary of a goal. A good example would be shoplifting. The reason that most people refrain from 
doing this is not because it?? illegal but because it would be morally wrong. The second filter113 is 
of economical nature. This filter would consist of various fines, like parking tickets.114 The third 
filter contains legal actions to correct these actions the previous two former filters do not filter out. 
In this case a good example would be smuggling drugs. This filter is closely related to the risk of 
getting caught. If the risk of getting caught is minimal then the effect of the filter will be reduced. 
Examples from the international context of the third filter would be to hold a state liable,115 or 
withdrawal of voting rights.116 The risk of getting caught is also applicable in this context, severely 
complicated by the need for causality,117 as well as the requirement of the act to be wrongful under 
international law. 
Of the above mentioned filters the last filter can be regarded as the most important, because 
changes that occur in this filter can lead to changes in the other two filters.118 A good example 
would be an obligation on the parties to submit reports. If they only should submit reports, there 
are no obligations, as should clearly do not impose any obligation on the parties. It could, 
however, have a normative effect by which some parties choose to follow. If should is changes to 
shall combined with a fee for non complying parties and an exclusion if a state fails to hand in 
report two consecutive years, it will probably be a better alignment. As we shall see below, plays 
the third filter also an important part in reducing implementation deficits.119 5.1.3  OPERATIONALISATION   
Goals need to be transformed into actions to be reached. The process by which a target is 
converted is called operationalisation. This process is particularly important in cases where targets 
are not very well defined, or too large to handle at once.120 A good example of such a target would 
be the overarching goal of sustainable development. The method of operationalisation can be done 
                                                                                                                                                
113 According to Carlman is this theory normally only applicable to the rule of law countries. Carlman 2007, 
supra footnote 54, p. 184.   
114 Westerlund calls this filter an economical filter. However, this filter only affects these who think the cost 
for the deviation is too high, and therefore will not deviate. If the price of deviation is acceptable then 
deviation will arguably take place to a higher degree. This would for example would be the case if you rent a 
car. In such a case the rental companies seldom transfer the speeding ticket to the renter. There is therefore 
not necessary to abide by the rule of not speeding.          
115 See; e.g., article 3, CBD; and Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel, 22 March 1989) EIF 5 May 1992. U.N.T.S. vol. 1673.    
116 See; e.g., Article XXVI, section 2 (b), (a) Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
(Washington, 27 December 1945) EIF 27 December 1945. U.N.T.S.  vol. 2.   
117 For a discussion, see Pulp Mills case, infra, note 271.  
118 Westerlund 1997, supra note 78, pp. 155-163.   
119 Westerlund 1997 supra footnote 78, p. 162.  
120 Ibid., pp. 43-51.  
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in several steps, where a target is divided in another targets, milestone goals. This procedure to 
break down goals into smaller manageable goals is often crucial to achieving these goals. To 
exemplify the process of operationalisation, an example based on the Gorilla Agreement121 will be 
used. 
The Gorilla Agreement can be viewed as a milestone target of sustainable development. Under the 
agreement, the goal is to preserve the gorillas.122 But as a result of the goal being not very specific 
there is a need to divide this objective in to measurable and manageable pieces. The process of 
doing so is the process of operationalisation.  
A sub-level target could be to maintain a viable population.123 This goal would not be measurable 
because it is not a very specific goal and as a result further sub-levels are needed.  
The next sub-level would be a planned population, such as a population of 120 gorillas. This level 
could be used as a reference level and if the current population falls below the reference level there 
is a measurable gap in the system.124 This approach is not a preferred one as the numbers of 
gorillas do not say anything about if the number equals a viable population. Therefore, the 
fulfilment of that goal gives no assurances that the target level above would automatically be met. 
As a result, a different approach and further sub-levels are needed.  
For this purpose, the law assumes a sufficient habitat reference.125 This could be viewed as an 
elastic law, which can take into account the non-linear structure of nature. However, the similar 
problem of measurability appears, unless this requirement is clarified and further divided. In this 
example, the variable of resources will be considered as a classification and clarification of 
adequate habitat legislation.126 
To meet the objectives of preserving the gorillas the sub-target covering resources must be met. As 
a result of a larger population, the demand for resources will increase.127 This will in turn have a 
negative effect on the resources available. As a result of this increasing demand, there will be 
fewer resources to share in the group. This will eventually result in increasing social pressure 
amongst the group members and counteract the target. 
                                                                                                                                                
121 See Supra Footnote 66.   
122 See Article I (3), Gorilla Agreement.  
123 Article I (3), Gorilla Agreement: Article 1 (c) (1), CMS.  
124 If will also work if the target is to keep the current population.   
125 Article I (3), Gorilla Agreement: Article 1 (c) (1), CMS. 
126 This variable can then further be divided, such as into water, food, area size.  
127 This would ultimately lead to the gorillas seeking food outside the designated areas and thus increase the 
conflicts over resources between gorillas and humans. 
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Returning to the adequate habitat regulation, it is clear from the above example that in order to 
control any negative effect on the gorilla population occurred as a result of the lack of resources, 
the legislation would benefit from adopting a Habitat Quality Standards (HQS) approach.128 This 
approach will focus on the quality of the habitat in relation to the existing population of gorillas, at 
any given time. This would benefit the gorillas, as a sufficient habitat not necessary mean a good 
quality of the habitat. Thus, HQS will undoubtedly have a positive impact on their conservation 
status. But these types of systems require extensive monitoring. As a result of the basic rule of 
law, in order to enforce HQS there needs to be some form of legislation in place that allows for 
enforcement.  
The HQS will eventually affect ???????? activities.129 A good example would be a farmer who 
wants to expand his farm. Part of this expansion will be done by encroaching on a protected 
habitat. If the outcome of this will have a negative effect of the HQS of this habitat, such 
expansion is not possible. 
There is a high probability the farmer will expand anyway if the site is located far away from the 
legislators. As a result, the risk for getting caught is very small. Thus the benefits overweight the 
risks. Furthermore, he never sees any gorillas anyway so he does not feel obligated to not 
expand.130  
As this example shows, the filters mentioned above do not stop the farmer. The last filter did not 
stop him because the risk of getting caught was minimal. Thus, the discrepancy resulted in a 
deficit that takes place between the goal and the end-result. In this example, the goal was adequate 
conservation of gorillas; the end result was insufficient protection. 5.1.4  IMPLEMENTATION  DEFICIT   
Deficits are losses between a goal and the end-result. In short, the implementation process is what 
happens between the goal and the end-result. This process is what shall be explained in this 
section. 
A goal is rarely to be met 100%, unless changes are made along the line. Especially in the 
environmental filed the end-result never be 100% of the target. The reasons for this are the 
expectation of losses that occurs at each stage of the implementation process. 
                                                                                                                                                
128 HQS need to take into account variables that can affect it.  
129 See Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 78, et passim.  
130 There is a difference between the moral obligation not to expanded and the moral obligation to restrain 
from expanding.  
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Losses can be of various kinds, it can appear in the development process between the objective 
and legal document, or between legal text and the actual compliance of states, people or 
companies. The only way to assure full compliance is to overload the material rule of the 
established legal document. By overloading the material rules the outcome will always sum up to 
100 % of the target, although the total losses.131 Overloading the material rules is not seen as 
compatible with the development part of the principle of sustainable development.132 As a result, it 
should be avoided. Instead, a feedback-system should be in place for the system to adapt and 
compensate for the losses without overloading the system.133 The process of implementation can 
be illustrated as follows: 
 
As the figure shows, the loss occurs in three steps. The Total Implementation Loss in the result 
column represents the difference between the outcome-and the goal, representing what has been 
lost along the way. 
The illustration contains four columns. They represent different stages of the process and it is 
between these steps losses occur. The first column represents the goal of the parties. An example 
of such a goal is the goal of sustainable development. Other examples would be, for example, the 
conservation of gorillas, or to keep the HQS. Thus, the process may be applied at all levels 
                                                                                                                                                
131 Overloading material rules means writing an overcapacity into the material rules to counteract the 
inefficiencies of the system. See Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 78, pp. 54-59.  
132 Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 78, p. 66.  
133 See Carlman, supra footnote 54, pp. 181-192.  
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requiring implementation. The second column represents the legal documents. This is the act 
governing the behaviour of the recipient. The highlighted in this column represents the final 
outcome of the process between the first and the second column. Here the first implementation 
deficit occurs. A good example why there are losses in this process would be political negotiation, 
which always takes place between a political incentive and the conclusion of a legal document. 
Another example is the lack of legal knowledge among these who negotiate or draft text.134 As 
will be described below, the reason the Ramsar convention did not come into force until nearly 
five years after conclusion was largely a result of this lack of legal knowledge in the negotiation 
and drafting process. Thus, this deficit is labelled a legal deficit, as it represents a deficits built into 
the legal document. As will be shown, this deficit can play an important role throughout the 
process of implementation, and impact on whether the loss reduces of increase. 
The second deficit is between the material rules and levels of actual compliance. As discussed 
above, it is never full compliance. Although some addressee just lacks the interests in 
complying,135 this loss also takes place as a result of misunderstandings and problems that occur at 
administrative level. It appears from the discussion above, that the three filters placed to correct 
unwanted actions, are place between these columns. Thus the legal document and the process 
behind it play an important role in the process taking place between the second and the third 
column. As a result of how the different filters, a higher level of losses, i.e. a lower level of 
compliance can be expected if the price of non-compliance is less than the cost of compliance.136 
The third step of deficit is between the third and the last column. As described above, the last 
column represents what is actually achieved. The loss taking place between the third and the last 
column is the result of various external sources. Example of such sources can be an emission from 
a source that affect the final result, but at the time of the preparation of the legal document could 
not have been expected.137 
                                                                                                                                                
134 Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 78, pp. 43-51.  
135 The lack of interest not to comply does not have to depend on low ethics or moral standards. It can 
simple be because the subject looses interest in the object and then ethical and moral obligations have no 
value regarding the object. Not meaning a reduction of the  ethical or moral standards of the subject at large. 
Akhtarkhavari outlines the importance of soft law in environmental governance, however, as soft law are not 
legally binding loosing interest will often result in a lack of motivation to obey by them. See Akhtarkhavari, 
A., Global Governance of the Environment - Environmental Principle and change in International Law and 
Politics (Cheltenham: 2010), pp. 67-83.  
136 See Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 78, p.162.  
137 The loss between the compliance and end-result could in this case depend on factors such as an 
legislation not adopted to take into account interacting factors. For example in order to control so a legal 
emission limits for a specific area is not exceeded, this for the benefit of the people living in the area. The 
legislation contains provision to regulates the emission of major factories in the area, however, if the 
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To illustrate the importance of the legislative process, an example will be given. Since the 
formulation is one of the most important aspects in interpretation of the obligation under a 
treaty,138 this example illustrates how the use of formulation affects the existence of obligation. 
The paragraphs in this example have been formulated to include the principle of sustainable 
development in the legal text. Whether this principle gives rise to any obligations depends on the 
wording. Thus, knowledge of the legal significance of wording is important because a lack of 
knowledge may result in additional implementation losses. 
  
 
The difference in the first paragraph, between the words RECOGNISES and ACKNOWLEDGE 
may be seen as of secondary importance. However, these differences have an effect of the 
existence of obligation. RECOGNISES introduce a (higher moral) obligation to actually take 
action in order to conserve the wild animals, which are an irreplaceable part of nature. 
ACKNOWLEDGE, however, only implies a (higher moral) obligation to take into account the 
truth that wild animals are an irreplaceable part of nature, and as such they must be preserved. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
legislation as such does not include a major highway located along the area, then the emission limit in the 
area could never be effectively regulated. As well as the burden of cost would only born by the factories, who 
has to reduce their omissions in order not to exceed the emission limits, and not shared by all polluters.   
138 See Article 31, Vienna Convention.  
?????????????????????????   
ACKNOWLEDGE  that  wild  animals  in  
their  innumerable  form  are  an  
??????????????????????????????????
natural  system  which  must  be  
conserved  for  the  good  of  mankind;  
  
AWARE  that  each  generation  of  man  
holds  the  resources  of  the  earth  for  
future  generations  and  has  an  
obligation  to  ensure  that  this  legacy  
is  conserved  and,  where  utilised,  is  
used  wisely.  
  
HAVE  AGREED  as  follow:  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
?????????????????????????   
RECOGNISES  that  wild  animals  in  their  
innumerable  form  are  an  
??????????????????????????????????
natural  system  which  must  be  
conserved  for  the  good  of  mankind;   
  
RECOGNISES  that  each  generation  of  
man  holds  the  resources  of  the  earth  
for  future  generations  and  has  an  
obligation  to  ensure  that  this  legacy  
is  conserved  and,  where  utilised,  is  
used  wisely.   
  
HAVE  AGREED  as  follow:  
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The changes in the second paragraph have a more serious effect on the existence of obligations. It 
follows from the changing of words, from RECOGNISES to AWARE, that all higher moral 
obligations to future generations are wipe out.139 As a result the needs of the future generations are 
put below the need of the present.140 Thus, the legal document is not be inline with principle of 
sustainable development. 
The above example illustrated the effect seemingly small changes can have when interpreting 
obligations under the treaty. 
As shown by the discussion taken place in this part, the legislative procedure plays an important 
role in all the above areas. But as discussed, it will always be legal deficits. This is the result of not 
overloading the legal texts, as overloading will not be in line with the principle of sustainable 
development. At the same time there is a need to consider the principle of equity within the same 
legal text. The result of not doing so would result in a legal text, not inline with the principle of 
sustainable development. 
As result, the legal text must be able to adapt and compensate for loses occurring without major 
procedure for its renegotiation.141 This requires not only a flexible piece of legislation but also 
require a responsible body in charge. The mandate and duties of such authority should be to 
strengthen the legal rules in order to correct the unwanted behaviour,142 which counteracts the 
goal.143 However, this requires a comprehensive feedback system in place.144  
Last but not least, it is important to recognize the principle of state sovereignty as a fundamental 
part of international relations. The importance of this principle will be discussed further below. 
                                                                                                                                                
139 When outlying the essence of sustainable law Decleris lists sustainability and justice as a second feature 
of it. Traditionally sustainability and justice was correlated with Ethics, however, the traditional concept of 
Ethics was to narrow to incorporate the greater moral purposes needed to have a sustainable law. Decleris 
therefore suggest a broader concept of Ethics need to be created in order to be able to incorporate moral 
obligations for future generations as well as nature. See Decleris supra footnote 17, p. 42.  
140 By placing the future generation below the present, there will automatically be a reduction in the 
possibility for the future generation to meet their needs as the present generation decides that it is okay to set 
the needs of the future generation below their own.  
141 See Decleris supra footnote 17, pp. 57-59.  
142 IMF, for example, have such a power.  
143 Carlman supra footnote 54, pp. 181-187.  
144 Such a system is for example in place in New Zeeland for monitoring the implementation of the 
Resource Management Act 1991 No 69 (hereinafter RMA); available at  
 <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/annual-survey/index.html>. 
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For now, according to the fundamental nature of this principle, states can not be held responsible 
their behaviour unless it clearly violates international law or treaties are bound to.145 
The above describes the theory part of this thesis.
                                                                                                                                                
145 Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 468-475.  
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PART  2  -­‐  MULTILATERAL  BIODIVERSITY-­‐RELATED  TREATIES  
Multilateral biodiversity-related treaties have been seen as the overall structure of governance and 
management of global biodiversity. This is probably an accurate description; since no country is 
able independently solve the problem of the deteriorating biodiversity. As will be shown, the 
approach taken by various MEAs to address conservation differs widely. You could have thought 
it would be a more streamlined process after almost 40 years of international concern. This part 
will highlight some of the more interesting approaches. 6 CONVENTION  ON  THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ANTARCTIC  MARINE  LIVING  RESOURCE  
The reason for including the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources was because it is regarded both as ?? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ???????????
??????????146 and recognized as a unique system for the conservation of living resources.147 The 
Convention is also the first international treaty with an objective containing a wide-range of 
conservation principles based on an ecosystem approach.148 As a result, the Convention provides a 
good example of how to adopt a flexible piece of legislation which is can take the complexity of 
nature into account, and at the same time be possible to measure by scientific data.149 For the 
possibility to take the uncertainty of nature into account the Convention adopts an approach that 
includes the precautionary principle, which corresponds with principle 15 of the Rio-declaration, 
150 and this is the foundation which governs the decisions over which conservation measures are 
needed. 
The Convention was initially adopted to deal with the uncontrolled harvesting of the krill in the 
Antarctic southern Ocean. The concern was economical in nature and more related to the potential 
adverse effects of over-fishing of krill may have on other potential economic resources in the area. 
                                                                                                                                                
146 See <http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/convention.php>   
147 See Annex B, CCAMLR-I, 1982.  
148 ??????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ???
conserve the Antarctic marine ecosystem: practical implementation of the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine L?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
791.  
149 Ibid., pp. 783-784.  
150 See Rio-declaration, supra ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
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Thus, the noble burden of the task to preserving the ecosystem of the region was of secondary 
concern.151 
6 .1  SPECIAL  FEATURES  AND  OBLIGATIONS  
Apparently, CCAMLR is unique in many respects. This section will highlight some of the more 
interesting features of the Convention.  
The Convention makes a distinction between different types of parties, Members of the 
Conventions (MOC) parties and non-MOC parties. The Commission for the Conservation of the 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (hereinafter Commission) is the Conventions decision-making 
body. To become a MOC parties signatories must either have been one of the founding parties, or 
be engaged in research or harvesting activities related to the Convention and in the covered 
area.152 As shown below, the Commission is important. It is mostly related to the extensive 
mandate of the Commission when it comes to planning and managing the resources in the area, 
through the formulation, adoption and review of Conservation Measures. 
It is the Conservation Measures that are the centrepiece of the Convention.153 However, it is not 
possible to understand the full meaning of the provisions governing these actions by simply 
looking into the Convention text. This applies in all international agreements, in which the texts 
rarely give all the answers. As a result, a text must always be read in relation to decisions from the 
authority body of these conventions, in the present case decision taken by the Commission.154 
Under the Convention text, the Conservation Measures shall be taken ??? ????? ???????? ??? ????
??????????? ???? ??????????? ???? ???? ??? ???????? ????155 where the objective is to conserve the marine 
living resources in Antarctica.156 
If the Conservation Measures is the centrepiece of the convention, the principles set out in article 
II (3) are the crown jewels, giving the Convention its unique character and enables the 
Conservation Measures to be decided on the basis of an ecosystem and precautionary approach. 
                                                                                                                                                
151 See Article II, paras. 1-2, Annex B, CCAMLR-I, 1982.  
152 Article VII, para. 2, CCAMLR.  
153 Article IX, CCAMLR.  
154 Constable et al., supra footnote 148, pp. 778-791.  
155 Article IX, para. 1, CCAMLR.  
156 Article II, para. 1, CCAMLR. The treaty specifically excludes the conservation of marine mammals, such 
as seals and whales, see para. 2, CCAMLR. They are instead covered respectively by; The convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (London, 11 February, 1972) EIF 11 March, 1978. U.N.T.S. vol. 1080, p. 
175; and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (Washington, 2 December 1946) EIF 10 
November 1948. U.N.T.S vol. 161.  
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The latter approach, that sets the behaviour for harvesting occurring within the area covered, reads 
as follows; 
??????????????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????????? ??????????? ??? ????????????? these  
which  ensure   its  stable  recruitment.  For  this  purpose   its  size  should  not  be  allowed  to  
fall  below  a  level  close  to  that  which  ensures  the  greatest  net  annual  increment ;  
  
maintenance  of  the  ecological  relationship  between  harvested,  dependent  and  related  
population   of   Antarctic   marine   living   resources   and   the   restoration   of   depleted  
population  to  the  level  defined  in  sub-­‐paragraph  (a)  above;  and  
  
prevention  of  changes  of  minimisation  of   the   risk  of  changes   in   the  marine  ecosystem  
which  are  not  potentially  reversible  over  the  or  three  decades,  ta king  into  account  the  
state  of  available  knowledge  of  the  direct  and   indirect   impact  of  harvesting,  the  effect  
of   the   introduction   of   alien   species   and   of   the   effects   of   associated   activities   on   the  
marine   ecosystem   and   of   the   effects   of   environmental   changes,   with   the   aim   of  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 157  
The above provisions constitute the basis on upon which management and harvesting of covered 
resources in the area must be based. As a result of these provisions and the obligation they contain 
to be considered in adopting ecosystem management and harvesting strategies, these provisions 
are the ecosystem-approach.158 Other obligations to take into account in this decisions are: 
scientific information on a species (a: recruitment criterion), the obligation to incorporate the 
effect of harvesting a species has on other, such as predators (b: predator criterion), and the 
obligation to take into account the long-time impact harvesting has on the ecosystem at large (c: 
duration criterion). The duration criterion makes the system more capable and adoptive to the 
probabilistic and multi-casual nature of the ecosystem, and allows the system to account for non-
linear fluctuations that occur over a longer period of time.159 
The above-mentioned provision does not define when there is a need to take the content into 
account. As a result, the early year of the Convention adopted a more reactive approach and took 
the provisions into account only when data signalled that something went wrong.160 This reactive 
approach was validated by the lack of scientific data, showing that the measure would have a 
                                                                                                                                                
157 Article III, CCAMLR.  
158 Mangel. M., et al., supra footnote 33, pp. 341-342 et passim.  
159 Constable et al., supra footnote 148, pp. 783-787.  
160 See, inter alia, Mangel. M., et al., supra footnote 33, pp. 355-357.; and Constable et al., supra footnote 
148, pp. 778-791.  
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negative impact on conservation. If something went wrong the lack of scientific data could be 
blamed.161 The precautionary approach is to prevent such excuses. 
The problem with the reactive management was emphasized in the report of the 10th meeting of 
the Commission.162 In this report the Commission recognised the unsustainability of approach 
taken so far. A request for a more long-term management strategy was emphasized.163 This new 
approach must also constantly adapt to a feedback system of information. The Commission 
recognized the negative consequences that would follow if they should wait for such a system. A 
new strategy was urgently required. As a result, the precautionary approach was recognised as an 
important part of the setting the annual catch limits.164 This new approach resulted in a new form 
of total allowable catch (TAC), precautionary total allowable catch limit (PTAC). Thus, PTAC 
was first adopted when setting catch limits for krill 1993.165 
The significance of this decision should not be underestimated. At first, long-term management 
strategy allows it to take into account the various uncertainties in the assessment. Secondly, by 
adopting the precautionary principle it is possible to move away from the annual setting of catch 
limits.166 Thirdly, the PTAC have come to play an important role in decision on catch limits for 
new types of biological resources in the area, previously not harvested for economical reasons. As 
a result of PTAC, the Commission can set catch limits for new species, although there is a small 
amount, if any, scientific data on such species.167 
The setting of PTAC at the Commission level also plays an important role in reducing the 
implementation deficit of the combined national level. Given that most of the area covered are 
beyond national jurisdiction. This is the result of the different interpretations, which would take 
place if each national states engaged in harvesting activities would determine where the catch limit 
should be. This would not be enough. This becomes particularly in large complex system or shared 
resources, where multiple factors intervene and which do not respect state borders. For such 
system and such resources to be managed effectively, there need to be a responsible authority who 
                                                                                                                                                
161 See, inter alia, Louka,  supra footnote 53, pp. 50-51.; and Carlman, supra footnote 54, pp. 185-189.  
162 See paras. 6.1-6.23, CCAMLR-X, 1991.  
163 See paras. 6.13, CCAMLR-X, 1991.  
164 This consideration was put to the MOC in 1989, See para. 46 and 120; Annex E, para. 5; and Appendix 2 
(WG-DAC 89/5) (Working Group for the Development of Approaches to Conservation), CCAMLR-VIII, 
1989.  
165 See paras. 6.17, 10.4, CCAMLR-X, 1991. Such a precautionary TAC was also introduced in 1993 for the 
Electrona carlsbergi, See article XII, 8.39 - CONSERVATION MEASURE 67/XII, CCAMLR, 1993.  
166 Constable et al., supra footnote 148, p. 785.  
167 Constable et al., supra footnote 148, pp. 785-786.  
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can take into account the bigger picture and a longer period of time.168 CCAMLR Commission 
meets these criteria. 6.2 ENFORCEMENT,  LIABILITY  AND  DISPUTE  SETTLEMENT  
CCAMLR is like most international convention, self-enforcing and based on cooperation.169 
However, there are two cases where the Convention contains enforcement procedures. 
The first case is linked to an obligation of the MOC parties to pay subscription.170 The failure to do 
so for two consecutive years in a row will result in withdrawal of rights to participate in the 
decision-making procedure of the Commission.171 The second one is connected to non-MOC 
parties and the amendment procedure. At first glance this procedure seems to be like any other 
amendment procedure. However, the convention takes an approach that if non-MOC parties fail to 
submit notification of approval within one year after entry into force of the amendment,172 they are 
regarded as have withdrawn form the convention.173 
For the self-enforcing obligations, the first is the obligation not to engage in activities 
counteracting the purpose and objective of the convention.174 This provision is merely a 
codification of the principle of Good Faith. As a result of being a customary rule this principle 
applies to all conventions.175 
Other obligations are the need to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the 
Convention and the Conservation measures. Compliance in this case is not the compliance of 
signatories but of an object subject to its jurisdiction.176 Connected to this is the obligation to 
provide feedback information, i.e. reporting. Reports shall cover, the extent of the measures 
taken,177 and information of sanction178 and persecution as a result of failure to comply.179 
                                                                                                                                                
168 See, Decleris supra footnote 17, pp. 57- 59.   
169 See, inter alia, the Rio-declaration supra footnote 58, principle 7 and 17, which emphasizes the need for 
co-operation for the protection of the environment and the Earth eco-system; and Wallace, R.M.M. and 
Martin-Ortega, O., supra footnote 69, p. 226    
170 Article XIX, para. 3, CCAMLR.  
171 Article XIX, para. 6, CCAMLR.  
172 Article XXX, para. 2, CCAMLR.  
173 Article XXX, para. 2, CCAMLR.  
174 Article III, CCAMLR.  
175 The codification in CCAMLR, however, expands the principle to cover also the area covered by the 
Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Treaty (Washington, 1 December 1959) EIF 23 June 1961. U.N.T.S. vol. 402.  
176 See Article XXIV, CCAMLR.  
177 Article XXI, CCAMLR.  
178 Article XXI, CCAMLR.  
179 See Article XXIV, CCAMLR.  
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Liability is not regulated within the Convention. This does not mean that a state can not be held 
liable under it; it just means that this will be governed by applicable sources of international 
law.180 This will be discussed more below in relation to other MEAs. 
The dispute settlement procedure is a standard one. This applies only to the interpretation or 
application of the Convention.181 The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) is the judicial choice, if 
the dispute can not be resolved by peaceful means.182 
7  CONVENTION  ON  WETLANDS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  IMPORTANCE  ESPECIALLY  AS  WATERFOWL  HABITAT 
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat is 
?????????????????????????????????which was adopted in the city of Ramsar, Iran, February 1971, in 
force December 1975. The pioneer part of the Convention was its scope. Most other biodiversity-
related conventions at that time were connected to species. Thus the Ramsar was an exception by 
being the first global conventions concluded for in order to preserve a special type of ecosystem.183 
Despite its pre-Rio status the convention has played an important role in clarifying the meaning of 
important concepts, such as the concept of wise use, which is the precursor to sustainable use. 
Thus, the use of wise use and sustainable use have the same meaning. As will be seen the wise use 
concept, also plays an important role in defining treaty obligations. 
As stated above, the treaty took almost five years before entering into force.184 This was the result 
of not involving lawyers in the drafting process.185 As a result of this has the convention been 
amendment twice.186 7.1 SPECIAL  FEATURES  AND  OBLIGATIONS  
The preamble of the Convention includes an interesting approach of how wetlands should be 
valued. The values of wetlands are not only an economical nature, but also for non-economical 
values, such as cultural value and recreational value.187 As a result, the loss of any of these values 
                                                                                                                                                
180 See article 38 S.I.C.J.  
181 Article XXV, CCAMLR.  
182 See Article 33, UN-Charter.  
183 Lausche, supra footnote 20, pp. 179-187.   
184 Id.  
185 Germany did initially not sign the convention as they saw no reason to do so due to the lack of 
obligations. Id.  
186 The Paris protocol 1982, EIF 1986, and the Regina amendments 1987, EIF 1994 .  
187 The recreational value is seldom seen in contemporary international environmental treaties. It can, 
however, be seen is another ????????????????????????? CMS.  
Biodiversity  Conventions  
 
is seen as an irreplaceable loss. It is therefore possibility to weight the recreational value of 
wetlands to the economical value deriving from exploitation of it. As a result, a high recreational 
value outweigh an economical value would make an exploitation of that wetland not possible.188 
The difficulty is how to calculate these types of values.189 
A brief comment will be made regarding the status of preambles from an international perspective. 
The preamble is in most cases not seen as a source intended to contain obligations, but more a 
political declaration.190 But as part of the context of the treaty, a preamble may play a key role in 
treaty interpretation.191 This is also the approach applied in international courts.192 The preamble is 
of particularly importance as a source for interpretation if the provision of the text is difficult to 
interpret or do not give a precise meaning of the words it contains.193 The ways courts have used 
the preamble are highlighted below. First the structure of Ramsar will be explained. 
The structure of Ramsar contains of three main pillars, which of the former and the latter will be 
highlighted: (1) the special attention to international important wetlands (article 2); (2) the wise 
use of all wetlands (article 3); and (3) international co-operation (see article 5).194 
First  Pillar  
The first pillar ????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??? ????
obligation to designate at least one wetland. This may be as a prerequisite to become a party to the 
convention.195 The choice of wetlands within its territory to be appointed rests with the state and 
therefore the listed wetland is not necessarily the most important one from an international view, 
or even of international importance.196  
Closely linked to the listing of wetlands is the exception clause. Here Ramsar are inline with other 
international treaties. Within the field of environmental agreements these possibilities for escapes 
                                                                                                                                                
188 Recreation value vs economical value is often a sensitive area. See, www.savingiceland.org.  
189 One approach could be to use the contingent valuation method ( CVM), ?????????????????????????????????
????????????????? ????????????????????????? ?????FAO Economic and Social Development Paper, version 
146; available at <www.fao.org/decuments>  
190 See Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, Award, 18 February 1977, 
United Nations Report of International Arbitral Awards, volume XXI, pp. 53-264.; available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf>.  
191 Article 31, para. 2, Vienna Convention.  
192 One early example would be the Beagle case, supra footnote 190.   
193 Dixon, M., Textbook on international Law, (6th ed.) (Oxford: 2007), pp. 72-75.  
194 See, inter alia, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: Ecosystem and Human Well-Being: Wetlands 
and Water. Synthesis, supra footnote 13, p. 17; the Stockholm declaration, supra footnote 21, principle 24; 
and Wallace, R.M.M. and Martin-Ortega, O., supra footnote 69, pp. 223-226.  
195 Article 2, para. 4, Ramsar.  
196 Article 2, para 2, Ramsar.  
Part  three  
   33 
can, however, have a significant negative impact on the environment. For example, when states 
accede to Ramsar they need to meet the prerequisite of designating a wetland. This condition is not 
a prerequisite to be a party, but to become a party. This becomes clear by looking at the text of the 
Convention, which clearly stipulates that the convention does not prejudiced state sovereignty.197 
As a result, is the designation of a wetland not absolute. In this case the exceptions allow the 
parties to remove, restrict or alter the boundaries of a listed wetland, if there are urgent national 
interests to do so.198 The term urgent national ?????????? is not defined within the Convention. So it 
is within the discretion of the state to classify these interests, in line with the principle of 
sovereignty. But to guide the parties in the interpretation and use of the exception of urgent 
national interests, as well as the provision of compensation associated with it, was a guideline was 
adopted at the 8th RAMSAR/COP.199 This guideline obviously does not entail obligations upon the 
parties.200 The guideline, however, mentions the importance of making an EIA prior to invoking 
the urgent national exception clause. As a result, a precautionary approach are be used to 
determine if there is an alternative planning and development of the particular wetland. This 
approach is to minimize or avoid any adverse effects may occur as a result of the right to use the 
exception.201 
Returning to state sovereignty, this is not absolute, despite the appearance to be so. This will be 
described more detailed below when dealing with the CBD. For now, the limitations of state 
sovereignty are linked to presence of shared wetlands. In these cases, international principles, such 
as the principle of prior consultation, restrict the discretion of the states. The old theory where 
states could ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? is no longer so rigid. This is the result of a logical 
necessity for states in the contemporary international arena to be more connected to other states, 
especially those nearby.202 
As briefly mentioned, there is an obligation to compensate for change made to a listed wetland. 
This is not compensation in monetary terms. It is compensation for loss taking places as a result of 
changes in a wetland, where it is compensated with gains resulting from designation of another 
                                                                                                                                                
197 See Article 2, para. 3, Ramsar, which mentions sovereign rights, however, sovereign right over natural 
resources are an accepted international principle, see infra note 261.  
198 Article 2, para. 5, Ramsar.  
199 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the Convention and considering compensation under Article 4.2, RAMSAR/COP-8.  
200 See Jóhannsdóttir who discusses whether or not COP decisions finds their way into national legislation's 
???? ????????? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????4), pp. 68?74.     
201 See, e.g., The Stockholm declaration, supra footnote 21, Rec. 51 and 61; and UN doc. A/Conf/48/4, draft 
of the declaration on the human environment, both document reflects the EIA procedure.   
202 Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A., The New Sovereignty - Compliance With International Regulatory 
Agreements (Cambridge: 1995), pp. 118-127. 
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equivalent area. In line with the text of the Convention parties should compensate for changes 
taking place as a result of urgent national interests.203 As a result, they are not obligated to do 
so.204 This is an example of a typical legal system where substantive rules first set obligations of 
the parties, but where the formal rules determine how and when these obligations can be 
avoided.205 Here the legal rules facilitate the implementation deficit rather than preventing it. On 
the other hand, the legal rules do not undermine the aim and the objective of the Convention. But 
they do give a considerable amount of leeway for the parties to take other considerations into 
account when deciding whether to appoint a new wetland, or a minor one.206 
Another requirement in the text of the convention is the obligation of international cooperation. It 
refers to the obligation to consult with other parties in the implementing of commitment under the 
convention.207 The obligation to do so, however, occurs only if there is a transboundary wetland. 
As a result, in other cases applicable international law,208 such as article 55 and 56 of the UN-
Charter, will govern cooperation; which will be explained further below. The result of this is also a 
limitation in the management of these non-transboundary wetlands. A limitation of this 
management would be the principle of not to cause damage.209 A good example of such limitation 
of management is the judgement of the c??????????????? ?????????????-Nagymaros Project. The 
above limitation in management is described as follows: 
?????????tence  of   the  general  obligation  of   States   to  ensure   the  activities  within   their  
jurisdiction   and   control   respect   the   environment   of   other   states   or   of   areas   beyond  
national   control   is   now   a   part   of   the   corpus   of   international   law   relating   to   the  
environmen???210  
                                                                                                                                                
203 Article 4, para. 2, Ramsar.  
204 Article 4, para. 2, Ramsar.  
205 See Guzman, A.T., How International Law Works ? A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford 2008), pp. 130-
132.  
206 See, Westerlund 1997, supra footnote 72, pp. 73-80, 157-163 et passim.  
207 Article 5, Ramsar.  
208 Op. cit. supra footnote 55.  
209 See Stockholm declaration, supra footnote 21, principle 21, which is obligates states ensure that 
??????????????????? ?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????ge to the environment of other states or of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? This is a codification of the Trail smelter Case (United States 
v. Canada), award 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941, United Nations Report of International Arbitral 
Awards, volume III, pp. 1905-1982.: available at <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-
1982.pdf>; and Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), 
Judgement, 9 April 1949, I.C.J. 1949.  
210 ????? ??????????? ???? ?????????-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement, 25 September 
1997, I.C.J. report 1997, para. 53. However, the outcome of the judgement in the Case Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay, (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgement, 20 April 2010, I.C.J. report 2010, shows a relative high 
burden of proof when it comes to prove an clear and visible casual effect between the measures taken and the 
actually claimed damage, See particularly dissenting opinion.  
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The judgement puts clear obligations of states to manage their resources in such a way so as not 
cause harm to other states interests. 
Second  Pillar  
The Second pillar including the wise use concept has become the most important aspect in the 
management and wetlands. In order to manage their wetlands, parties are to: 
?[F]ormulate   and   implement   their   planning   so   as   to   promote   the   conservation   of   the  
wetlands   included   in   the   List,   and  as   far   as   possible   the  wise  use  of  wetlands   in   their  
???????????
211  
In order to promote the conservation of wetlands, the implementation of measures is done by 
creating nature reserves.212 These types of enclosed areas are a typical way to preserve natural 
resources, whether they are called parks, reserves or closed areas.213 When the parties to Ramsar 
have created such reserves, the management of it should as far as possible be made within the 
limits of wise use. In this case the term far as possible gives the state a great deal of manoeuvre. 
Then what is wise use? The Convention provides not definition. Thus, a definition of it has 
gradually evolved through RAMSAR/COP recommendations and resolutions. 
The question of the definition of the term wise use was raised at the first RAMSAR/COP. From 
this meeting two recommendations will be highlighted. The first214 emphasized that wise use 
includes the maintenance of the ecological character.215 This is not only relating to conservation 
but also to the principle of sustainable development.216 The second recommendation all about 
decisions taken in relations to large-scale projects of wetland transformation and stresses the 
importance of these decisions not to be taken ???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
???????????217 These two recommendations were to play an important part in the definition and 
interpretation of wise use. 
                                                                                                                                                
211 Article 3, Ramsar.   
212 See Article 4, para. 1, Ramsar.   
213 See Inter alia, Glowka, L., et al., A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (IUCN) 
(Cambridge: 1994), pp. 22-23; and Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 78-83. Closed areas are also frequently used 
as conservation measures for marine resources; this is for example used by CCAMLR.   
214 Rec., 1.5., RAMSAR/COP-1 1980.  
215 As outlined in article 3, para. 2, Ramsar.  
216 The Rec. specifically refers to the World Conservation Strategy. This strategy is a comprehensive work 
addressing conservation of nature. The primary concern is with the ecological sustainability. This is opposite 
to the approach in the Brundtland report, which is more concentrated to satisfy human needs: available at < 
http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCS-004.pdf >; Accessed 15.41, 18 July 2011.  
217 Rec. 1.6, RAMSAR/COP-1.  
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Seven years later, was the emphasis on the need to develop a definition of wise use, this in order to 
guide the parties in their implementation of the convention.218 As a result a working group was 
established.219 However attached to this recommendation, a working definition of the concept of 
wise use was attached. This Annex also contained definitions of sustainable utilisation and natural 
properties of the ecosystem. The definitions of latter two were later accepted by a following 
resolution.220 The definitions are as follows;221 
?????????????????????????? ??? ?????? ???????????????????????? ???? ???    benefit  of  humankind  
in  a  way  compatible  with  the  maintenance  of  the  natural  properties  of  the  ecosystem.   
  
???????????? ???????????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????? ???? ??? ?????????? ??? ????? ??????? ?????? ????
greatest   continuous   benefit   to   present   generations  while  main taining   its   potential   to  
meet  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  future  generations.   
  
???????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????? ??? ? these   physical,   biological   or  
chemical   components,   such   as   soil,   water,   plants,   animals   and   nutrients,   and   the  
interactions  ??????????????   
In the following COP the parties where first recommended to adopt and implement ?Guidelines for 
implementation of the wise use concept of the Convention.?222 The attached ?Framework for the 
implementation of the Ramsar convention? in another resolution from the same meeting was seen 
as the basis ?????????????????????????????????????????223 This framework contained different types 
of commitments, which parties should apply in the implementation process. With reference to all 
previously RAMSAR/COP recommendations and resolutions, a commitment was ???? ?????
environmental impact assessments (EIA) before transformations of wetlands.?224 
In RAMSAR/COP-5 further guidelines where added. This meeting also clearly identified both the 
precautionary principle as well as EIA as vital parts of the concept of wise use.225 This led to a 
recommendation in the following meeting reminding of all the previously recommendations, and 
again urged the parties to integrate environmental concern into their management of wetlands.226 
This was repeated in resolutions of RAMSAR/COP-7. These resolutions also stress the importance 
of making an EIA of projects that may affect the listed sites.227 The COP also adopted the 
                                                                                                                                                
218 Rec. 3.3, RAMSAR/COP-3.  
219 Rec. 3.1, RAMSAR/COP-3.  
220 Res. VI.1, RAMSAR/COP-6.  
221 See Annex Definition of Wise Use, RAMSAR/COP-3.  
222 Rec. 4.10, RAMSAR/COP-4  
223 See Annex to DOC. C.4.12 (Rev.), RAMSAR/COP-4.   
224 See DOC. C.4.l2 (Rev.) Attachment 1, para. 2 (a) (II), RAMSAR/COP-4.  
225 Res. 5.6, RAMSAR/COP-5.  
226 Rec. 6.2, RAMSAR/COP-6.  
227 Res. VII.16, RAMSAR/COP-7.  
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?Wetland Risk Assessment Framework.?228 RAMSAR/COP-8 followed the previously meeting; 
now urging the parties to use the CBD guideline ?Incorporating biodiversity-related issues into 
environmental impact assessment legislation and/or processes and in strategic environmental 
assessment.?229 The guideline was later replaced, and the new one was adopted thought 
RAMSAR/COP-9.230 
Now the question boils down to what the above means? There is apparently no amendment to the 
treaty and the definition of the wise use had developed by COP recommendations and resolutions. 
A normal approach to these types of documents is to consider them as a non-source of legal 
obligations. The question is whether this view is correct. 
The Lagoon of Lac Bay is located on the island of Bonaire of the Netherlands Antilles. The area is 
a listed under the Ramsar convention.231 To develop tourism, a company applied and was granted 
permissions to build a resort village near the lagoon.232 The resort was largely outside the 500-
meter buffer zone, but a part of the resort extended into the zone. Although the permission was 
granted by the right authority, the Governor decided to annul them. As a basis for revocation of the 
permissions the Governor claimed them to be inconsistent with obligations existing under Ramsar. 
In this case the Governor did not only refer to the text of the Convention, but also to the obligation 
to carry out an EIA before such permissions could be grated, and in this case no such EIA had 
been performed. As Ramsar does not contain any obligation to perform an EIA the revocation was 
appealed to the Netherlands Crown (Crown). 
Having the case on its table, the Crown experience difficulties as the relevant provision did not 
itself ?????????ch to hold on to.?233 As a result, they had to resort to other means on interpretation. 
This other way was to interpret the convention in accordance with the provision of the Vienna 
Convention; specially article 31, which read as follows; 
?????????????shall  be  interpreted  in  good  faith  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  meaning  
to  be  given  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  in  their  context  and  in  the  light  of   its  object  and  
purpose.  
                                                                                                                                                
228 Res. VII. 10, RAMSAR/COP-7.  
229 Res. VIII.9, RAMSAR/COP-8.  
230 Res. X.17, RAMSAR/COP-9.  
231 See Ramsar website.  
232 The example is taken from Jonathan M. Vershuuren, Ramsar Soft Law is Not Soft at All. Discussion of 
the 2007 Decision by the Netherlands Crown on the Lac Ramsar Site on the Island of Bonaire, Milieu en 
Recht, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 28-34, 2008; English version available at 
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1306982>.  
233 Ibid.  
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2.   The   context   for   the   purpose   of   the   interpretation   of   a   treaty   shall   comprise,   in  
addition  to  the  text,  including  its  preamble  and  annexes:   
(a)   any   agreement   relating   to   the   treaty   which   was   made   between   all   the   parties   in  
connection  with  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty;   
(b)   any   instrument   which   was   made   by   one   or   more   parties   in   connec tion   with   the  
conclusion  of  the  treaty  and  accepted  by  the  other  parties  as  an   instrument  related  to  
the  treaty.  
3.  There  shall  be  taken  into  account,  together  with  the  context:   
(a)  any  subsequent  agreement  between  the  parties  regarding  the  interpretation   of  the  
treaty  or  the  application  of  its  provisions;   
(b)   any   subsequent   practice   in   the   application   of   the   treaty   which   establishes   the  
agreement  of  the  parties  regarding  its  interpretation;   
(c)   any   relevant   rules   of   international   law   applicable   in   the   rela tions   between   the  
?????????   
By adopting the above rule, the Crown came to the conclusion that the resolutions and 
recommendations may in fact add obligations to the treaty text. This was particularly the case 
when the recommendations and resolutions had been adopted unanimously.234 The unanimous part 
was important because it was ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????above-cited 
rule.235 This interpretation has also been adopted several times by the I.C.J.236 
The way the court interpreted the obligations that existed under Ramsar is important. It illustrates 
how the recommendations and resolutions may affect the existence of treaty obligations, 
particularly if the treaty text itself is not clear and interpretative. This interpretation is probably not 
shared by the signatory states, and the question is whether states even are aware of these 
resolutions and recommendations when implementing the signed convention.237 Although a 
national court, this case demonstrates the importance of COP recommendation and resolutions and 
the impact they may have. As a result, they should not be considered as completely worthless 
documents. 
FEEDBACK-­‐SYSTEM  
The feedback of information is not well regulated in the Convention, this despite the importance 
feedback play in the decision-making process of the COP.238 The only obligation to report is 
linked to changes that has happened, are happening, or is likely to happen, in the ecological 
                                                                                                                                                
234 Ibid.  
235 Dixon, supra footnote193, pp. 72-75.  
236 Id.  
237 See Jóhannsdóttir, et al.,  supra footnote 199, at not 84.  
238 See Article 6, para. 2, Ramsar.  
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character of the wetlands,239 or in connection to threatened wetlands listed in the Monteux Record, 
which will be addressed below. Thus, the approach of the Convention to the probabilistic, multi-
casual nature of the ecosystem is a reactive one. Such an approach is not consistent with the 
preamble of the Convention, which describes the need for the parties to adopt a long-term 
perspective in the implementing of national policies, as well as a need for international 
coordination of measures to halt the loss of wetlands. The grounds for labelling of the approach as 
a reactive one are twofold. 
The first reason is the still existing uncertainty about the precise meaning of the concepts changes, 
likely to and ecological character, although there are working definitions found in the case of the 
first and the latter.240 The definitions do not clearly give obligations to anticipatory reporting. As a 
result, there is no obligation to monitor the wetlands on a regularly basis, i.e. on a yearly basis. 
Thus, there would arguably be a lack of a sustainable long-term strategy, despite the preamble 
describing the term as an important part in adopted of national policies for the conservation of 
wetlands. The term likely would also be a reactive approach because it is more to be interpreted as 
and obligation to report when some action already took place and there will be an imminent risk of 
an adverse effect of a wetland. 
The second reason is directly connected to the first. It is based on the lack of a mandatory 
feedback system, where parties are required to provide continuous information on a year-to-year 
basis. Such a response would be crucial to measure if the national management plans are inline 
with the provision of being far-sighted. Presumably, if there is no such feedback system in place, 
there can be no international coordinated measures taken in combination with a far-sighted 
national plan. International coordinating of actions will therefore always be a reactive approach to 
wetlands conservation, and usually plays an important role only when the wetlands already have 
been seriously affected, or even worse lost and must be replaced. These international coordinated 
actions will therefore be a non cost-effective way for the international community to contribute to 
the conservation of wetlands. 
                                                                                                                                                
239 See, inter alia, article 3, para. 2, ???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
(1995) Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 41, issue 2, pp: 1-52; and Res. VIII.8, para. 20, 
RAMSAR/COP-8, highlight the importance of reporting when the matter reported according to article 3 para. 
2, have been resolved, however not legally binding parties as it only calls upon the parties to report.  
240 See, inter alia, Bowman, Id.; and Res. VI.1, Annex 1, RAMSAR/COP-6, which contains a working 
definition of the Ecological Character and Change in Ecological Character ???????? ??? ????????? ?????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????-relationships between the biological, chemical, and physical 
components of the wetland. These derive from the interactions of individual processes, functions, attributes 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in any of these processes and ???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
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Returning to the Monteux Record mentioned above.241 This record can be said to be a result of the 
non-proactive coordination of international actions for the benefit of wetlands. The record was 
adopted to keep a separate list for threatened sites, and to give the secretariat242 a mandate to take 
further actions on these sites. The expanded mandate of the secretariat is to; (a) consult with a 
contracting party when it comes to their attention that a site located under the jurisdiction of a 
party ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
development, pollut??????????????????????????????????243 and (b) to request additional information 
on the present status of the wetland.244 The Monteux Record adopts a more proactive approach as 
the listing of site also expands reporting requirement for the parties. The obligation is to submit 
report on an annual basis.245 Thus, a closer monitoring of the status of the wetland is required. This 
could argued to have a positive effect on the conservation status of the wetland, as changes in the 
wetlands ecosystem can more easily be detected at an earlier stage, leading to a reduction on the 
cost of tackling the problem. 7.2 ENFORCEMENT,  LIABILITY  AND  DISPUTE  SETTLEMENT  PROCEDURES  
Regarding the procedures for enforcement, liability and disputes, the convention text is silence. 
This is probably the result of the non-involvement of judicial knowledge in the drafting process, 
and the first MOP recognized the need to include at least a dispute settlement procedure.246 As 
mentioned above, these areas will therefore be governed by applicable sources of international 
law. Liability for example might occur if management on one side of a transboundary wetland has 
a significant influence on the part of the wetland located at the other side of the border. Relevant 
source of international law in this case can be the principle of not to cause damage. The source of 
dispute settlement will be first and foremost the Charter of the United Nations.247 
8  CONVENTION  ON  BIOLOGICAL  DIVERSITY  &  PROTOCOLS  
                                                                                                                                                
241 See, Rec. IV.8, RAMSAR/COP-4; and Res. V.4, RAMSAR/COP-5.   
242 Previously known as the Bureau.  
243 See para. 2, Annex, Res. V.5, RAMSAR/COP-5.  
244 See para. 3, Annex, Res. V.5, RAMSAR/COP-5.  
245 See, para. 5, Annex, Res. V.5, RAMSAR/COP-5. Bering in mind the possibility of a party to disagree to 
placing the site on the list. See para. 2, Annex, Res. V.4, RAMSAR/COP-5.  
246 See, inter alia, COP-1 (1980), this procedure have, however, not been finalised; and Compliance 
Mechanisms Under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (UNEP) (Nairobi: 2007), pp. 34-36.   
247 See Article 2 (3); 33, UN-Charter.   
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The Convention on Biological Diversity, also known as the Convention of Biodiversity, is one of 
the two conventions opened for signing at the Rio-conference.248 CBD is a comprehensive 
framework addressing the conservation of biodiversity on a global scale.249 The closest parable 
would be UNCLOS. Like UNCLOS CBD covers almost the total scope of one area, and as an all-
embracing convention it overlaps the contemporary patchwork of international environmental 
agreements.  
The Convention has a three-tiered objective,250 which of only the first and the second will be 
addressed. The third part is connected to genetic resources and thereby falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. The three parts of the objectives are:  
1 .  [T]he conservation of biological diversity.  
2 .  [T]he sustainable use of its components.  
3 .  [T]he fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources.  
The all-embracing feature of the Convention includes forests. This it not clearly spelled out but it 
follows from the definitions in article 2, CBD. This is important, as the obligations discussed 
below also shall be interpreted as covering these areas, in spite of the reluctance of states to sign 
legally binding agreement covering the management of forests.251 
Despite of being of an all-embracing feature, the Convention does not regulate all relevant areas. 
As a result, three agreements dealing with specific topics have been adopted. The three agreements 
are: The Cartagena protocol;252 and its Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena protocol on Biosafety (hereinafter supplementary Nagoya protocol);253 and the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
                                                                                                                                                
248 The other being the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (UNFCCC) (New York, 
9 May 1992) EIF 21 March 1994. U.N.T.S vol. 1771.  
249 Louka, supra footnote 53, p. 299.  
250 See article 1, CBD.  
251 The reluctance of state to sign legally binding agreement can be seen in the discussion taken place at 
UNCED where a declaration about forest ended up with the title Non-Legally binding Authoritative Statement 
of Principles for Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all 
Types of Forests. See UNCED, supra footnote 58, Annex III. Further, more there are up to date no 
international legal instruments regulating the management of forests. There are, however an ambitious UN 
program to address the issue of deforestation, See The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD programme), 
especially REDD+; <www.un-red.org>.  
252 See, Supra footnote 44.  
253 See Supra footnote 45.   
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Arising from the Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 254 For reasons given 
above only the two former will be addressed. 
The Cartagena protocol is a result of the combination of article 8 (g), 17, and 19 paras 3 and 4, of 
CBD. The Cartagena protocol covers both the first and the second column of CBDs objective,255 
and follows CBDs anthropocentric approach, in addressing the modern biotechnology of living 
modified organism (LMOs). The scope of the protocol is to address the potential adverse effects 
LMOs might have on the conservation and the sustainable use of biodiversity, including human 
health.256 The protocol covers LMOs in a transboundary context; focusing especially on the 
handling, transport and use of these.257 The approach used for this purpose is a precautionary 
approach in order to reach an adequate level of protection.258 
The supplementary Cartagena protocol, not yet in force, is an outcome of article 27 of the 
Cartagena protocol, where the COP are given the mandate to adopt processes and procedures to 
address the issues of liability and redress relating to damage resulting from the transboundary 
movement of LMOs.  
This protocol together with the Cartagena protocol and CBD will be examined further to 
highlighting the special features relevant for this thesis. 8.1 SPECIAL  FEATURES  AND  OBLIGATIONS     8.1.1  CONVENTION  ON  BIOLOGICAL  DIVERSITY  
The Convention of Biological Diversity contains a large amount of obligations. Therefore is it 
more comparable with UNCLOS than with biodiversity-related MEAs. Nevertheless, the major 
part of obligations under it shall, however, take place only as far as possible and as appropriate. 
Giving quite a leeway for parties to evaluate what is appropriate for them and how far they are 
willing to go to conserve the biodiversity within their jurisdiction. This is not all bad as it allows 
parties to take measures suitable to their situations. 
                                                                                                                                                
254 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from the Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (the Nagoya Protocol) (Nagoya, 
adopted 29 October 2010), not yet in force, as of July 2010 the protocol has 39 signatories of 50.  
255 See Preamble, Cartagena protocol.  
256 Article 1, Cartagena protocol.  
257 Id.  
258 Id.  
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Article 3 of the Convention expressly mentions state sovereignty over resources. The provision is 
a direct replica of principle 2 of the Rio-declaration,259 which is based on principles principle 21 of 
the Stockholm declaration.260 To reaffirm state sovereignty is a normal approach in international 
treaties, especially these covering any type of resources. It also confirms a long process over right 
to resources situated within the jurisdiction of a state.261 Thus this principle is now seen as a 
customary rule, as outlines in principle 1 of the International Law Associations (ILA) New Delhi 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development.262 
If article 1, CBD, defines the objective of the Convention, then article 2 narrows the scope, by 
defining key term. The Convention covers biological resources having some actual or potential 
use and value for humanity.263 The covered area is first and foremost conservation in In-situ.264 In-
situ ??? ???????? ??? ?????????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? the maintenance and 
???????????? ?? ????????????????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????????????Ecosystem and Habitat 
are, respectively, defined as; ??? ???????? ???????? ??? ???????? ??????? ???? ?????-organism 
communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit;????????????????????
type of site where a ... population naturally occurs.??This definition clearly excludes domesticated 
animals, as well as animals bred for consumption. 
One important feature of CBD is the obligations connected to perform EIA. According to the 
Convention shall an EIA be performed in order to avoid or minimise significant adverse effect on 
biological diversity.265 The obligation to perform an EIA is first and foremost related to projects,266 
programmes and policies.267 According to the Convention, if the national legislation does not 
contain any provisions requiring the performance of EIA, they need to be introduced.268 If they 
                                                                                                                                                
259 The Rio-declaration, supra footnote 58, Annex 1, principle 2.  
260 The Stockholm-declaration, supra footnote 21, part 1, chapter 1, section II, principle 21.  
261 See, inter alia, UN doc. A/RES/1803(XVII) Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, GA Res. 
1803 (XVII), 1194th plenary meeting, 14 December 1962; UN doc. A/RES/2158 (XXI) Permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, GA Res. 2158 (XXI), 1478th plenary meeting, 25 November 1966; and 
UN doc. A/RES/3171 (XXVIII) Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, GA Res 3171, 2203rd plenary 
meeting, 17 December 1973.  
262 New Delhi ILA Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development 
(Delhi, 6 April 2002). The principles where adopted by International Law Association (ILA) at their 70th 
conference. See, inter alia, ILA Newsletter No. 16 2002, and No.17 2003; available at <http://www.ila-
hq.org/>, Principles available at <www.cisdl.org/pdf/new_delhi_declaration.pdf>; and Report of the World 
Summit on sustainable development, supra note 93.   
263 Glowka et al., supra footnote 213, pp.16-17.  
264 Conservation itself is not defined or used by it own in the convention due to concerns over the meaning 
of the term would shift to give more emphasis on the preservation aspects. See Glowka, Ibid., p. 25.  
265 Article 14, para. 1 (a), CBD; which reflects principle 17 in the Rio-declaration, supra note 58.  
266 Article 14, para. 1 (a), CBD.  
267 Article 14, para. 1 (b), CBD.  
268 Article 14, para. 1 (a), CBD.  
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already exist, the Convention require signatories to review them, so they take into account the 
negative impact projects, programmes and policies can have on biodiversity.269 In spite of the 
Convention being silence of what type of projects270 should be covered by this obligation, these 
obligations normally cover larger projects. Nevertheless, in the absence of any guidance, it is up to 
the state to define what projects should be covered and which should not. This seemingly lack of 
restrictions of state power to decide over these matter is, however, some what balanced when it 
comes to project potentially having transboundary effects. In these cases there is strong evidence 
of a customary rule obligating state to perform an EIA.271 This would limit the discretion to 
exclude some projects. 
Further delimitations of state discretion, connected to project potentially having transboundary 
effects, are the customary rule of the obligation of consultation. The obligation of consultation is 
an important customary rule and contains two aspects. The first aspect is the duty of a state to 
inform other potentially affected states about actions which might have a negative impact on their 
territory. The second aspect is the duty of the state taking the measures to enter into prior 
negotiation with potentially affected states. Both the duty to inform,272 as well as the duty to enter 
into prior consultation273 are seen as prior conditions when undertaking projects, which might 
have a negative transboundary effects. 
As mentioned above, the Convention contains a number of as far as possible, which is a kind of 
escape clause. However, there are restrains within the Convention from using these exceptions, or 
rather obligation to consider before using them. On important provision in this aspect is article 3, 
                                                                                                                                                
269 Glowka et al., supra footnote 213, p. 71.  
270 For programmes and  policies see below.  
271 See Pulp Mills case, supra footnote 210, para. 204. ?????? ??????????????????????????????????? ???????????
and preserve...has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so much 
acceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law to 
undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that...activity may have a significant 
adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and 
the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have been exercised, if a 
party planning works liable to affect the regime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an 
environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of such work???  
272 See, inter alia, Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 120-125; The Rio-declaration, supra footnote 58, principle 
19; The UN-Charter, especially  article 1 (3);UN Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625, 25th Session, 1883rd plenary meeting, 24 October 1970, 
reaffirmed in UN doc. A/RES/65/222, Promotion of peace as a vital requirement for full enjoyment of all 
human rights by all, GA Res 65/222, 65th session, 71st plenary meeting, 21 December 2011.  
273 The principle of prior consultation where established through the Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. 
Spain), Award 16 November 1945, United Nations Report of International Arbitral Awards, 281, 1975, See 
Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 39-47; English version available at   
<http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails?id=COU-143747&index=courtdecisions>. 
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CBD. This article contains a reference to the UN-Charter,274 which makes it clear a state no longer 
can pursue its course in silence when managing their biodiversity resources. 
The reference to the UN-Charter has this effect as in management and exploiting biological 
resources states need to take into account their obligations under Charter. The foundation for this 
obligation is based on states commitment to jointly and/or separately take actions for the purpose 
of achieving the goals set out in article 55 of the Charter.275 According to article 55 are states, 
amongst other, obligated to work for a solution of an international known problem, which 
eventually might have an impact on the economy, the society at large, and he human health.276 The 
loss of biodiversity will without doubt eventually have such an impact. 
Further more the Charter contains the obligation to take into account both intra- and 
intergeneration equity. This follows from reading article 55 of the UN-charter together with is 
preamble. Whiles article ???????????????????????????????????????????????????the preamble outlines that 
one purpose of this stability is to ????? ???????????????????? ????? ???? ???????????????? This could 
arguably be seen as a far-fetched interpretation, as well as the loss of biodiversity cannot lead to 
war. This might be true, the loss it self might not, but the effect of that loss, resulting in a 
reduction of the eco-system services as we know it, might. A good comparison would be the area 
of water resources. This area is commonly known as a being an area of conflict, where different 
?????????? dispute over the right to water. Also it is commonly known that unless the problem with 
the wasteful management, the shrinking layer of ground water, and quality of the surface water is 
addressed, it is not unlikely to expect further armed conflict in the future. Thus, the interpretation 
is not so far-fetch after all.277  
As a result, the conservation and management of biodiversity within the sovereignty of a state 
needs to be handled in accordance with the obligation arousing under the UN-Charter, especially 
when this resource moved over state jurisdictional boundary. This means, if a state uses the 
resources available within their jurisdiction in such a way so the international problem of loss of 
biodiversity is not addressed, then they would have failed to fulfil their obligation towards the 
future generations, not only based on the UN-Charter, but also based on the principle of 
sustainable development as inter-generation equity is am inseparable part of this principle. As a 
logic result, the right of a state to use its resources is only a right to use. As an effect, states are 
                                                                                                                                                
274 Article 3, CBD.  
275 Article 55, UN-Charter.  
276 See, inter alia, Glowka, et al., supra footnote 213, p. 26; and International Law Commissions Report 
from The Hague (2010), part one (collective Responsibility); available at <www.ila-hq.org>.  
277 See, inter alia, GBO-2, supra footnote 13: and GBO-3, supra footnote 14.  
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obligated, when exercising their right to use, to take into account the long-time impact of that 
use.278 This obligation does not only follow from the UN-Charter and principle of sustainable 
development, it is clearly spelled out within the text of CBD, where sustainable use is defined as; 
??????? ???? ??? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ?? ????? ????? ????? ????
lead   to   the   long-­‐term  decline  of  biological   diversity,   thereby  maintaining   its   potential  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 279  
This definition of sustainable use is ecosystem-oriented, this because it does not only refer to the 
sustainable use of one specific biological resource, but to biological diversity at large. As a result, 
in order to reach sustainable use, one components of one biological resource cannot be used in 
such a way so other biological resources are harmed. Neither can the use of one component result 
in the long-term decline of others.280 This is inline with the consideration taken into account by the 
Commission of CCAMLR. 
The conservation of the biodiversity is further strengthening by the ecosystem approach 
incorporated in article 10 (b), CBD. This article ?????????????????????????????easures relating to the 
use of biological resources to avoid or minimise adverse impact on biological diversity.?281 This 
implies an obligation for the parties to adopt a precautionary approach in their decision-making 
process when deciding over matters potentially having an adverse impact on the conversation of 
biological resources.282 
More interestingly, the above would also apply to programs and policies, and here the convention 
reaches deep into the decision-making process of the state. This is so because the provision does 
not give possibilities for exceptions. Thus, it covers all programs and policies, from taxation and 
agriculture to energy and transport. It is said that to implement the full scope of this provision 
would require considerate changes in the way parties develop, and implement, programs and 
policies.283 This will, however, not be analysed further in this thesis as it requires a more 
comprehensive examination. 
Finally an important feature at which it differs from other biodiversity-related MEAs is connected 
to CBD?s relationship towards other international agreements.284 The approach to start with a 
                                                                                                                                                
278 Cordonire Segger, et al., supra footnote 98, pp. 99-100.  
279 Article 2, CBD.  
280 Glowka, et al., supra footnote 213, p.24.  
281 Glowka, et al., supra footnote 213, pp. 59-60.  
282 See, inter. alia, Article 10 (c) CBD; and Glowka, et al., supra footnote 213, pp. 59-60.  
283 Glowka, et al., supra footnote 213, pp. 72-73.  
284 See Article 22, CBD.  
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typical one describing that the obligations under the Convention does not affect the rights and 
obligations deriving from other existing treaties. To this is there one interesting exception. 
Accordingly, any obligation arousing under other treaties which would cause a serious damage or 
threat to the biodiversity shall be disregarded.285 Thus in conflict with another treaty containing 
obligations that have the above effect the CBD will prevail. 286 More important, this also applies to 
the Cartagena protocol287 and the Supplementary Nagoya protocol.288 8.1.2 THE  CARTAGENA  PROTOCOL   ON  BIODIVERSITY  
As described above, the scope of the Cartagena protocol is Biosafety connected to the transfer, 
handling and use of LMOs, ???????may have adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable 
???? ??? ??????????? ???????????289 May have reflects the precautionary approach adopted by the 
protocol. Despite containing the precautionary approach, the protocol does not define its meaning. 
The definition of this approach can be found in the Rio-declaration and principle 15, which defines 
it in a negative sense: ??here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
???????????????????????????290 A good example would be a state that requires a factory to adopt a 
new cleaning-technology as a condition for granting a new license, despite the lack of scientific 
data on the full extent of the negative impact of the emissions emanating from the factory.  
To ensure that the precautionary approach will contribute to and ensure an adequate level of 
protection, there is a need to incorporate this approach at all level of decision-making which 
relates to matters covered by the protocol. The protocol is only one way to assure an adequate 
level of protection. This is the result of the word contribute. As a consequence, for the measures 
taken to contribute to and ensure this adequate level of protection the measures needed in each 
specific situation must be taken, whether these are measures according to the Cartagena protocol 
or not. The evaluation of the types of measures needed, the uniqueness and needs of every 
situation has to be taken into account, to ensure an the measures taken in that specific situation 
will contribute and ensuring an adequate level of protection.291 
                                                                                                                                                
285 See, inter alia, Glowka, et al., supra footnote 213,  p.109; and Lausche, supra footnote 20, pp. 309-327.   
286 Leading to interesting questions over the relationship with CBD and economical treaties.  
287 Article 32, Cartagena protocol.  
288 Article 16, Supplementary Nagoya protocol.   
289 Article 1, Cartagena protocol.  
290 See Rio-declaration, supra footnote 58, Annex 1, principle 15.   
291 Mackenzie, R., et al., An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena protocol on Biosafety (IUCN) 
(Cambridge:2003), pp.45-49.  
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The Cartagena protocol is in contrast to the supplementary Nagoya protocol not per se only 
applicable on transfer, handling or use deriving from transboundary movement. This is the 
result of the wording of specifically focusing on in article 1, Cartagena protocol,292 although 
some provisions apply only in those three areas. This makes the Cartagena protocol difficult to 
interpret, and as such an example of an undesirable way to write a legal document if the idea is 
to adopt a uniform approach to a common problem.293 
An example of a provision not only applicable in the context of transboundary movement is article 
23. This article codifies the principle of public participation and access to information and justice. 
It reflect principle 10 of the Rio-declaration, as codified in the three pillars of the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters294 (Aarhus convention). The three pillars of the Aarhus convention is; (i) 
public participation; (ii) access to information; and (iii) access to justice.295 Although article 23 of 
the Cartagena protocol is wider than its article 14 (1) (a), where public participation only applies to 
projects likely to have a significant adverse effect, it does not contain the third pillar on access to 
justice. Article 23 does not contain a clear obligation to give people access to information. This 
follows from the paragraph of the article covering this topic, according to which states are only 
endeavours to ensure access to information.296 The obligation to do so is limited to promote and 
facilitate public awareness and participation, in order to create ????????????? ??? ??????????
????????????297 Finally, addresses article 23 an obligation to consult with the public in their 
decision-making process.298 This obligation, however, is weakened by the exception for the 
protection of confidential information, as well as the discretion of the state to decide who shall 
have these rights. This is strange because public participation is seen as playing a central role in 
environmental protection. 8.1.3  THE  SUPPLEMENTARY  NAGOYA  PROTOCOL  
                                                                                                                                                
292 Ibid., pp.45-49.  
293 Recognising the difficulties of political negotiations taking place before a treaty can be adopted..  
294 The Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus, 25 June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001. U.N.T.S. vol. 
2161, p. 447 (Aarhus Convention).  
295 See Rio-declaration, supra footnote 58, Annex 1, principle 10 of the Rio-declaration, which reads as 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? relevant 
level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy???????????????????????  
296 Article 23 (1) (b), Cartagena protocol.  
297 Mackenzie et al., supra footnote 291, pp. 45-49.  
298 Article 23 (2), Cartagena protocol.  
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The supplementary Nagoya protocol was drafted in order to adopt rules and procedures to address 
any damage resulting from transboundary movements of LMOs.299 Nota Bene the supplementary 
Nagoya protocol is not a protocol governing liability and compensation between states. Instead, it 
contains rules and procedures to be implemented by member states in their national legislation, in 
order to harmonize rules on liability and compensation between subjects under their jurisdiction. 
The purpose of harmonizing measures, rules and procedures, is to ????????????????????????????????
and sustainable use of biological diversity?300 by reducing the opportunities for companies to take 
advantage of differences in national legislation. The civil liability in the treaty is, however, 
debatably not legally binding.301 The supplementary protocol is a good example in how to 
augmented framework legislation by providing detailed information on the rules to be 
implemented in national legislations.302 This type of amendments to the mother treaty will also 
help to reduce the legal deficits because it gives detailed instructions of what should be regulated 
and how. This would also minimize the risk for idiosyncratic approaches at administrative 
levels.303 The states, however, receive a carte blanche in terms of exemptions where they can 
provide for obligations other than those ??????? ???? ????? ???? ????? ?????? 304 Nota Bene, when 
deciding whether an exception should be granted states must apply the precautionary principle, 
and do an EIA, of this decision.305 This is the result of the rules regulating this in CBD as they also 
apply for the supplementary Nagoya protocol.306 
FEEDBACK-­‐SYSTEM  
The feedback-system is based upon information submitted by the parties. Of interests are reporting 
under the CBD. Reports shall initially include information about the measures taken to implement 
the Convention. Secondly, it shall include an evaluation of the effectiveness of these measures, in 
terms of their contribution to meet objective of the Convention.307 This is important because states 
have to evaluate their actions, not just take them. An evaluation of activities at national level 
                                                                                                                                                
299 Inline with Rio-declaration, supra footnote 58, principle 13, see the preamble of the Supplementary 
Nagoya protocol.  
300 Article 1, Supplementary Nagoya protocol.  
301 See, inter alia???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Civil Liability in the 
???????? ??? ???????????????????????? ????????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
Politic, Law and Economics (2009) vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 15-27.   
302 See Article 1, Supplementary Nagoya protocol.  
303 See, e.g., Hollo, et al.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Understanding the Global system: The Finnish Perspective. Ed. Jukka Kayhkö and Linda Talve (Figare: 
2002); available at <http://www.sci.utu.fi/projects/maantiede/figare/UGS/index.html>.  
304 Article 6 (2), Supplementary Nagoya protocol.   
305 See Preamble, Supplementary Nagoya protocol.   
306 Article 16 (3), Supplementary Nagoya protocol.  
307 Article 26, CBD.  
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would arguable be better than an assessment made by an institution at an international level, based 
on submitted reports. It is arguable so for two reason. At first, it is at the national level actions 
must be taken to conserve biodiversity resources, and a measure taken in one state may not be 
suitable in another. Secondly, it becomes easier to assess whether the measures taken are 
appropriate to their conditions, while being efficient enough to meet the objectives of an 
international treaty. 
Reporting under the Cartagena protocol is not as developed, and reports only need to include 
implementation measures taken.308  
Reporting in the supplementary Nagoya protocol serves a different purpose. The report aims to 
provide information in make assessment of the effectiveness of the rules of the supplementary 
protocol. One must remember that the rules in the supplementary Nagoya protocol are more of a 
procedural nature, to be implemented within the states, rather than rules to be follow by the 
signatory states.309 8.2 ENFORCEMENT,  LIABILITY  AND  DISPUTE  SETTLEMENT  PROCEDURES  
None of the agreements contains provisions on liability in the event parties are in breach with 
treaty obligations. Thus, this will be governed by the applicable sources of international law. 
Dispute settlement procedure in CBD applies both to the Cartagena protocol,310 and the 
supplementary Nagoya protocol.311 The provision is of a traditional approach and only applies to 
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. Disputes shall be 
resolved by either; (i) negotiation; (ii) though good office or mediation; or (iii) judicial settlement 
or conciliation. The conciliation procedure is the default procedure.312 
None of the agreement provides a formal non-compliance procedure.313 However, the Cartagena 
protocol has adopted procedures and mechanisms to address non-compliance.314 Under these 
                                                                                                                                                
308 Article 33, Cartagena protocol.  
309 Article 13, Supplementary Nagoya protocol.  
310 Article 34, Cartagena protocol.  
311 Article 16, Supplementary Nagoya Protocol.  
312 Article 27, CBD.  
313 There are, however, a working group established to review the implementation of CBD. See Compliance 
Mechanisms Under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, supra footnote 246, pp.47-48.  
314 Decision Bs-I/7, Annex, para. 2 (d) of section VI, UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/15.  
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procedures may the decision-making body of the convention take actions in the event of repeated 
non-compliance. However, what type of actions they can take has never been defined.315 9 CONVENTION  CONCERNING  THE  PROTECTION  OF  THE  WORLD  CULTURAL  AND  NATURAL  HERITAGE  
The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage316 entered 
into force in December 1975. The background to the Convention was the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam in Egypt. The project, which threatened to flood the monument of Nubia, 
especially the temple of Abu Simbel, made it clear for the international community that there was 
a need for cooperation to save the heritage of humanity, especially for future generation. WHC 
was drafted for this purpose.317 The Convention covers two types of heritage, Cultural and Natural. 
Cultural Heritages318 includes monuments such as the Taj Mahal in India, civil engineering 
construction, as the Canal du Midi in France, but also cultural landscapes in which man and nature 
influences are combined such as Mount Athos in Greece. Natural Heritages, 319 on the other hand, 
are not only places of outstanding universal value, such as the Great Barrier Reef, it also covers 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????.? The prerequisite to be within the scope of the 
convention is universal significance from a scientific or conservational viewpoint.  
The heritages are listed either in the World Heritage List,320 or the list of World Heritage in 
Danger.321 The difference in listing are that sites listed in the latter are places under increasingly 
pressure; not only from natural occurring events, anthropocentric pollution or tourism, but also 
from other sources, such as conflicts over the site itself, or political conflict within a state. 9.1 SPECIAL  FEATURES  AND  OBLIGATIONS  
Obligations can take place as a result of the convention text or in connection to actions taking 
place as a result of the Convention. The latter type of obligations is connected to such as 
agreements concluded for the benefit of getting assistance from the World Heritage Fund, or to the 
nomination process in order to get a site listed. These processes will be addressed further below. 
In order to facilitate the implementation process, as well as the nominating process, the World 
Heritage Committee has produces guidelines. One of these guidelines, the Operational Guideline 
                                                                                                                                                
315 See, e.g., UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/3/2/Add; and UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/2/add.1.  
316 See supra footnote 46.  
317 See, inter alia, Lausche supra footnote 20, pp. 89-93: and WHC web-site.  
318 Article 1, WHC.  
319 Article 2, WHC.  
320 Article 11 (3), WHC.  
321 Article 11 (4), WHC.  
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for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention,322 contains, amongst other, guidelines 
for the management systems each party shall implement in order to reach the aim and the objective 
of the Convention. Paragraph 109 in the guideline reads as follows: 
????? ???????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ???? effective   protection    of   the  
nominated  property  for  present  and  future   ??????????????????????????????   
This paragraph is closely connected to article 4 of the Convention text, which outlines the 
obligations to ensure the transmission of listed sites to the future, for the benefit of future 
generations. Thus, this article corresponds with the principles of inter-generation equity, which is, 
as mentioned above, a core principle within the principle sustainable development.323 The 
guideline further defines effective management as management taken into account the ??????? ???
long-term.?324 However, the guideline does not define the term. A guiding example to what the 
??????????????-????????????????????the approach used within CCAMLR, the eco-system approach. 
In this approach CCAMLR take into account the long-term effect of the non-linear nature of the 
ecosystem over a longer period of time, such as 20/30 years. Thus, it becomes clear an equivalent 
time-aspect would be appropriate. 
The guideline also addresses sustainable use, in an interesting way. The approach taken is that in 
????? ?????? ????an use would not be appropriate.?? To be appropriate, the use must be both 
ecologically and culturally sustainable and at the same time the use cannot have an adverse impact 
on the integrity of that site.325 
As mentioned above, there are obligations connected to the nominating procedures as well as the 
procedures to seek assistance from the World Heritage Fund. For the purpose of facilitating these 
processes the guideline contains templates.326 Note Bene, being templates in a guide they cannot be 
considered to be the foundation for any obligation. Nevertheless, as they are used by WHC, they 
are more to be considered as prerequisites in order to be eligible to seek assistance from the World 
Heritage Fund. As a result, it is an obligation to fulfil the entire prerequisite to be eligible to seek 
for assistance. The Fund will be discussed further below. For now, the obligations regarding the 
nomination of new sites nominating states are at first required to implement measures for the 
protection of the site. Secondly, they need to have a management plan that ensures the protection 
of the site. Thirdly, they are required to present ??? ????????? ????????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ?????
                                                                                                                                                
322 Operational Guideline for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (UNESCO) (Paris 
2008): Available at <www.unesco.org>.  
323 See WHC-11/35.COM/5E, 35th Session of the Committee. 
324 Para. 112, Operational Guidelines, supra footnote 322. 
325 Para. 119, Operational Guidelines, supra footnote 322. 
326 See chapter III, Operational Guidelines, supra footnote 322. 
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protection actually ????????? ?????????? ????????327 This is vital as this gives a lower boundary, 
which later can be used in the evaluation process whether these measures in fact was sufficient for 
the protection of the site or if further measures are needed. Thus, these are obligations nominating 
states has to fulfil in order get a site considered for listing. 
As for obligations deriving directly from the Convention text the centrepiece for obligations reads 
as follows; 
?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????????? ??????????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ????????? ????
identification,   protection,   conservation,   presentation   and   transmission   to   future  
generations   of   the   cultural   and   natural   heritage   referred   to   in   Article   1   and   2   and  
situated  on  its  territory,  belongs  primarily  to  that  State.  It  will  do  all  it  can  to  this  end,  
to   the   utmost   of   its   own   resources   and,   where   appropriate,   with   any   international  
assistance   and   co-­‐operation,   in   particular,   financial,   artistic,   scientific   and   technical,  
????????????????????????????????328  
The obligations deriving from this piece are, amongst other, the duty to ensure the protection of 
??????? ?????? ???????????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????????d species of animals and plants of outstanding 
universal values from the point of view of science or conservation.?329 For the purpose of 
protecting and conserving these sites, the management of these sites has to incorporate a long-term 
view as discussed above. This long-term view can be seen as a prerequisite in order to ensure the 
transmission of these species and habitats to future generations. Nota Bene, the species does not 
have to be endangered but merely threatened. The difference is fundamental, as a species can be 
threatened without being endangered. This differs from most other MEA covering species, where a 
difference is made between endangered and non-endangered species, where the former almost 
always enjoys a better protection. As we will see this is the approach adopted by CMS. 
The adoption of an ecosystem approach seems to be a key role in effective conservation 
management. This has been seen both in CCAMLR, as well as CBD. At the same, time if such 
management shall ensure the transition of a base of resources to future generations, as well as be 
seen as an effective management, there is also a need to adopt a precautionary approach. In spite 
of this, the precautionary approach is neither mention in the WHC text, in the mentioned 
guideline, or clearly visible in meeting documents. Arguable, this does not mean there is no 
obligation to adopt a precautionary approach when adopting implementation measures as a result 
of the signing of the Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                
327 Para. 132 (5), Operational Guidelines, supra footnote 322. 
328 Article 4, WHC.  
329 See Article 2, WHC.  
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On the other hand, the existence of such an obligation could be contested on the foundation that 
the relevant provision does not contain any obligation that could be interpreted in this way. The 
relevant provision would in this case be article 5, WHC. This provision, outlining measures to be 
taken to ensure effective management of a site, does not put any obligations upon parties as the 
provision only contains the wording shall endeavour.330 This is, however, not a Carte Blanche, as 
???????? ???? ??????????? ????? ??????? ????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????????? ?? ????????
heritage.331 As a consequence, parties are obligated to evaluate whether the intended measure 
might damage a site, i.e. an assessment of the effect of these measure has to take place. Further 
more, it clearly follows from the text that this obligation to make an assessment also covers actions 
or projects outside the site, which might have even an indirect damage of the site. As is apparent, 
the threshold for obligation of assessment is low as the text only refers to might damage. This is 
considerable lower approach comparing to other MEAs, where the damage usually has to be 
significant. As a conclusion, there is an obligation to assess whether a site would be affected, this 
does not, however, give enough to argue for obligation to adopt a precautionary approach. This 
follows from article 5, HWC, not contain any obligatory measures. 
On the other hand, article 6, WHC, obligates parties to adopt an approach, which guarantee that 
the measures taken do not have a potential harmful effect on the protected sites. This clearly 
incorporates the obligation to adopt a precautionary approach, as this approach is the only 
approach that even closely can be regarded as fulfilling the guarantee requirement. 
Further obligations under the Convention are the general obligation to pay subscription, at least 
every two years. There are two kinds of subscription; (1) an amount based on a percentage 
deciding of the main authority body, and (2) a yearly voluntary contribution.332 ??????????????????
??????? ???? similar meaning as within CCAMLR. If a party is arrears with its payment for two 
consecutive years this party are not eligible to be elected as a member for the decision-making 
organ of the Convention.333  
At last, the Convention contains the commonly existing provisions of the obligation to co-
operate.334 What differs in this case is the existence of the obligation to assist. This, however, 
                                                                                                                                                
330 Article 5, WHC.  
331 Article 6 (3), WHC.  
332 Article 16, WHC.  
333 A seated person can, however, end his term, see article 16 (5), WHC.  
334 Article 6 (1), WHC.  
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mainly refers to the occurrence of events requiring major cooperation in order to protect further 
degradation of, or the risk of loosing, a world heritage site.335 
The above-mentioned World Heritage Fund336 was established under WCH to assist parties in their 
management of protected sites. From this fund parties are eligible to seek assistance for a number 
of reasons,337 such as for protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of listed sites.338 
To receive assistance parties need to comply with the rules laid down in a specific agreement.339 
The Convention does not itself outline what such an agreement should contain. As a result, and for 
the purpose of streamlining this process, a standardised agreement has been adopted.340 The 
Convention text does, however, contain obligations connected to such an agreement. On of these 
obligations are to information the public of the importance of the site for which assistance is 
received.341 Closely connected to this obligation are the general obligations to inform the public 
about activities carried out and connected to protected sites, as well as dangers threatening that site 
as a result of human or natural interferences.342 
FEEDBACK-­‐SYSTEM  
The Feedback system is a classic, based on self-reporting, which parties are to provide relevant 
information about the implementation measures taken, and the status of listed sites within their 
jurisdiction.343 Reporting on the implementation measures taken shall include legislative measures, 
administrative measures, as well as other actions taken to meet the objectives of the Convention. 
Another interesting part of the reporting is the gained experience issue, where the parties are to 
exchange experiences gained during the implementation,344 and resemblance the evaluation 
approach in CBD. As a result of a reporting period of at least every sixth year,345 is the approach 
clearly a reactive approach.346 9.2 ENFORCEMENT,  LIABILITY  AND  DISPUTE  SETTLEMENT  PROCEDURES  
                                                                                                                                                
335 Article 6 (2), WHC.  
336 Article 15, WHC.  
337 Article 16, WHC.  
338 See Articles 13, 20, and 22, WHC.  
339 Article 26, WHC.  
340 This agreement will, however, not be addressed further. See e.g. Decision ? 01COM VI.B (d).46.   
341 Article 28, WHC.  
342 Article 27 (2), WHC.  
343 Article 29, WHC.  
344 Article 29, WHC.  
345 See the Operational Guideline, which, however, only invites states to do so. Operational Guidelines, 
supra note 322, para 203.   
346 Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 316-318.  
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As one of the older conventions WHC does not contain any provisions governing liability, dispute 
settlement, or non-compliance. This will therefore be governed by the applicable sources of 
international law. Disputes do occur, although not a dispute about the application or interpretation 
of the Convention, there is currently a pending case at I.C.J. regarding the listed temple of Preah 
Vihear.347 10 CONVENTION  ON  THE  CONSERVATION  OF  MIGRATORY  SPECIES  OF  WILD  ANIMALS  
The Convention on the conservation of Migratory Species of wild animals is the result of 
recommendation 32 of the Action Plan for the human Environment, adopted at the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm 1972. The recommendation specifically 
mentions the need to protect species migrating between jurisdictions.348 The scope of the 
Convention is not primarily to provide protection, but to contribute to better conservation of 
migratory species. Second, this contribution does not arise directly from the Convention text. 
Instead, CMS is to provide a framework and umbrella where agreements shall be concluded spun. 
With these agreements are CMS to establish a system ??????????????????????????????????????????????
species under the same policy with rega?????????????????????????????????????????????????349 10.1 GENERAL  STRUCTURE  AND  OBLIGATIONS  
For species to come within the range of CMS, it must be considered a Migratory Species by 
meeting the conditions of the following definition: 
?????????????????????????????ny  geographically  separated  part  of  the  population  of  any  
species  of  lower  taxon  of  wild  animals,  as  significant  proportion  of  whose  member  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 350  
The definition includes a number of prerequisite. There must be a population (a) of wild (b) 
animal (c) of which a significant part (d) migrates (e) cyclically (f) and predictably (g) over a 
boundary between two or more national jurisdictions (h).  
                                                                                                                                                
347 See Case regarding Request for interpretation of the judgement of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning 
the temple of Preah Vihaer (Cambodia v Thailand) (Cambodia v Thailand, Pending, 28 April 2011. As a 
result of the ongoing dispute over the listed site, located on the boarder between Thailand and Cambodia, 
Thailand announced its withdrawal from WHC on 26 June 2011, based on a decision from WHC to review 
??????????? ?????????????????????????????  
348 See supra footnote 21.  
349 See Preparatory work; Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft (June 1974) of International Convention 
on the Conservation of Migratory Species. Note 10, Part II. The draft was obtained at UNEP/CMS Secretariat 
(hereinafter referred to as Exp. Note, CMS ? 74; the year are the year of the draft to which the explanatory 
notes was attached).  
350 Article 1 (1) (a), CMS.   
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This study will highlight four of them; (c) the presence of an animal, (e-f) the cyclonical and 
predictably movement; and (h) the presence of a judicial border. 
The first condition does not clearly define what a species of wild animal are, and therefore it is not 
clear whether this definition includes insects or not.351 The question is relevant as to expand the 
scope of the Convention beyond the intended initial boundary may have a negative effect on the 
overall efforts to conserve migratory species for which the convention was drafted.352 One of the 
reasons is the redistribution of resources from other areas. Arguable insects would better be 
recognized as part of biodiversity then animals and their conservation should therefore be covered 
by CBD. The basis for this view is triple. First, the early draft of the convention exempted them.353 
Secondly, there is no evidence that the change of the text in the drafting negotiations meant a 
difference in that aspect. The text was rather altered to include species such as whales and 
exploitable fishes, over which there was great controversy in the drafting process.354 Thirdly, 
highly qualified writers never mention insects in connection to the convention.355 A reasonable 
conclusion is therefore a scope limited to animals, excluding insects. 
The conditions of cyclically and predictable movement have been defined broadly by CMS/COP 
decisions.356 Cyclically is to be construed as any cycle of nature, whether it is, for example, 
annual, life and climate. The reference to climate suggests that the cyclically changes that occurs 
as a result of any changes in climate, whether these changes are due to anthropocentric influences, 
would fall within the definition. Predictability should be interpreted as a movement that can be 
anticipated depending on the circumstances, and more important, it need not be regular in time. 
Since these two prerequisites are closely linked to each other they must be interpreted in close 
relationship. 
The fourth condition is the existence of jurisdictional boundaries, over which movement take 
place. Neither here does the Convention contains any definition. According to the early records of 
the Convention was the t????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in order 
                                                                                                                                                
351 Bearing in mind the listed Monarch Butterfly (Danaus plexippus).  
352 This is important if the connection is made to the often constrained economical situations of most MEA 
secretariat, to widen the scope to much will diverge vital resources from the core area of the convention. This 
will arguable have a negative affect on the overall conservation work.  
353 Para 2, Exp. Note, CMS ? 75.  
354 Lausche, supra footnote 53, pp. 169-177.  
355 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
O. and Parmann, G. (eds.), Green Global Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environmental and 
Development 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 67-77:Louka, E., supra note, pp. 335-342.  
356 See, inter alia, at II, Exp. Note, CMS ? 74; and Resolution 2.2, CMS/COP-2.  
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meet future regulatory regimes in the sea.357 Only when it comes to land does ?????sdictional 
????????????de facto ??????????????????????????Thus, the definition is only relevant where there 
are maritime zones involved. As can be seen by reading the early document, the term 
jurisdictional boundaries shall be deemed to include limits of national fisheries zones, in which 
costal states exercise exclusive fishing rights. The inclusion of these limits was seen as a logical 
conclusion, not because of the exclusive right to fish in these areas, but due to the coastal states 
sovereign right to adopt conservation measure for living resources in the area.358 The result of this 
is that coastal states have sovereign right to implement conservation measures in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), it also means that a species moving between the territorial sea and the 
EEZ, which belong to the same costal state, are not covered by CMS. The consequence of this 
approach is, despite the fact that coastal states have sovereign right to exploit natural resources on 
the continental shelf,359 the species moving on the seabed between the territorial sea and the 
seabed located under the EEZ crossing a jurisdictional boundary as the coastal state does not have 
the sovereign right in exercise conservation measures over the seabed beyond the territorial sea. 
Species moving across these boundaries therefore falls under the convention.360 
The jurisdictional boundary condition symbolizes the major obstacles for CMS in contributions to 
the preservation of species migrating, because they rarely move across only one boundary. The 
obstacle is not the border itself, but rather the principle of sovereignty attached to it.361 The 
Convention does not like other conventions, explicitly mention sovereignty of a state to exploit its 
own resources. However, this can not be interpreted as meaning a prejudice of that right, as the 
sovereign right can be viewed as a customary rule. 
As a consequence of the principle of sovereignty, a state has the right to exploit their resources, 
and their resources are resources under their jurisdiction any given time. As a result, there is no 
special right for the state of origin to a resource once it left their jurisdiction.362 This correlates 
with the view adopted by the UNCLOS where anadromous species originating in one state does 
not give the origin state any special right once these species left their jurisdiction.363 The question 
may be whether migratory species can be seen as an international resource, bringing an 
                                                                                                                                                
357 Note 3, Exp. Note, CMS ? 76.  
358 See, inter alia, at VI, Exp. Note, CMS ? 74; and Article 56, UNCLOS.   
359 Article 77, UNCLOS.  
360 Another interesting question increased in the 1976 Exp. Note, CMS ? 76 is the relationship to the special 
regime of areas covered by treaties in the Antarctic Treaty series, where there are no national jurisdictional 
boundary.  
361 Another principle would be the principle of freedom of the high seas; which will not be covered in this 
study.  
362 See Klemm C. supra footnote 355, pp. 67-69  
363 See Article 66, UNCLOS.  
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international obligation to preserve it? The answer to this question can not be positive. The reason 
for this is that migratory species can not be regarded as a common resource, such as resources of 
the High Seas.364 This is especially true for those species constantly within the jurisdiction of one 
state. Consequently, there can be no universal obligations to conserve these species in accordance 
with the obligations to conserve under UNCLOS.365 Moreover, there is no recognition in 
international law for either rights, which would follow the idea of shared resources or obligations 
to conserve these resources as a result of other states entitled to it. To acknowledge this would be a 
departure from the principle of sovereignty over resources within state jurisdiction.366 For this 
reason, any obligation to conserve migratory species must be written in formal instruments, to 
bind the state to act or not to act in a certain way. 
In contrary to the above, the first drafts of the CMS did include a duty to take into account of other 
government interests in management of migratory species. In these documents, migratory species 
was considered a common resource. Thus, the first versions of the fundamental principle of the 
Convention were as follows: 
??????? ???????????? ??????? ??????????? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??????????? ?? ?????????
common   to   all   states   whose   territory   lie   within   their   range.   They   agree   to   manage  
these   common   resources   taking   fully   into   account   the   interests   of   each   of   the  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? 367 
The approach used was a joint sovereignty approach. The idea behind this was based on the non-
recognition of international law over any special rights to the states of origin over migratory 
species. This was considered surprising as migratory species are an international phenomenon and 
no can alone provide effective management for conservation.368 The sovereign approach was a 
new approach that gave states or origin rights to have their interests considered in other states 
when they managed migrating species. Despite lack of evidence for a changing of the status of 
migratory species to be regarded as anything but a natural resource belonging to the state under 
whose jurisdiction it resides for the moment, migratory species have ???????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????s.369 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
                                                                                                                                                
364 The exception would be it the species fall within the scope of UNCLOS. 
365 See, e.g., Article 192, UNCLOS.  
366 Klemm C. supra footnote 255, p.69.  
367 Draft International Convention on the Conservation on Migratory Species, CMS ? 74.  
368 Exp. Note, CMS ? 74.  
369 Resolution 7.10, CMS/COP-7.  
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of WHC,370 and insinuates that states have a greater obligation and right regarding these species. 
This is obviously not inline with the principle of state sovereignty. 
For some reason was the text of the fundamental principle changed, and the present version reads 
as follows:371 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of   Range   States   agreeing   to   take   action   to   this   end   whenever   possible   and  
appropriate,   paying   special   attention   to  migratory   species   the   conservation    status   of  
which   is   unfavourable,   and   taking   individually   or   in   co -­‐operation   appropriate   and  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 372 
The current version is based on principle 4 of the Stockholm declaration.373 In accordance with the 
current version the parties agree to take appropriate and necessary actions. The approach for these 
actions must be a wise wildlife management approach in which states individually and in 
cooperation with other units shall work for the preservation of not only migratory species but also 
their habits.374 
The concept of wise wildlife management is not defined the Convention text, in COP decisions, 
and there are no clues in the preparatory work on the exact meaning of it. Nor are there any clues 
in the document arising from the Stockholm Conference. The concept has appeared recently in one 
of the most ambiguously national legislations enacted to protection of the environment. The 
concept was introduced in ?????????????????????? ??????????????375 (RMA) in 1990, and was 
considered revolutionary.376 RMA defines the term as follows: 
????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????? ????????????? ??????????????????
natural   and   physical   resources   in   a   way,   or   at   a   rate,   which   enables   people   and  
communities   to   provide   for   their   social,   economic,   and   cultural   well-­‐being   and   for  
their  health  and  safety  while;  
  
sustaining  the  potential  of  natural  and  physical  resources  (excluding  minerals)  to  meet  
the  reasonably  foreseeable  needs  of  future  generations;  and   
  
safeguarding  the  life-­‐supporting  capacity  of  air,  water,  soil,  and  ecosystems;  and   
                                                                                                                                                
370 See Article 2, CWH.  
371 The changes took place after 5 of august 1977 and before the Plenary meeting. CMS records, however, 
do not contain any documents to clarify why the changes took place.  
372 Article II (1), CMS.  
373 The present version was adopted at the plenary meeting in Bonn, June 1979, See. SumPl 14, 22 June 
1979; and PL 44, 21 June 1979, which specially referred to principle 4 of the Stockholm Declaration; 
available through the UNEP/CMS Secretariat.  
374 See Article 1 (c) (4), CMS.  
375 See RMA, supra note?.  
376 See, Bosselmann, supra footnote 89, et passim.  
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avoiding,   remedying,   or   mitigating   any   adverse   effects   of   activities   on   the  
environment??   
As the term is used in this definition wise wildlife management includes much more than just 
management of the migratory species or their habitats. This definition also covers important 
aspects such as the inter-generation equity, making it more inline with the principle of sustainable 
development. 
Although not defining the term itself, as well as the above definition of RMA can not be directly 
applicable, it is clear that the term wise wildlife management in CMS has a much broader scope 
than the term wise use, referred to in the preamble. Thus, the term wise wildlife management 
impose more obligations of the signatories in the performance of their obligation under CMS. This 
is a logical conclusion as the status of species will automatically be unfavourable if the criteria of 
wise wildlife management are not met.377 This approach would also be more inline with the 
principle of state sovereignty, as opposed to the ?common natural heritage? approach, since this 
approach does not give anyone the rights to require a state to recognize their right when managing 
its resources. 
Furthermore, the above fundamental principle is applicable to all migratory species, whether they 
are listed in the appendices to the Conventions or not. This is the result of reading article II (1), 
CMS, in combination with above described definition of Migratory Species;378 none of them refers 
to the appendices. Furthermore, there is an obligation under the fundamental principles despite 
status. This is the result of article II (1), CMS, since it only describes that the parties shall pay 
special attention to those species having an unfavourable conservation status. This is not a specific 
reference to species in Appendix II, but only refers to the special needs of migratory species 
having an unfavourable conservation status.379 As a result, the full extent of the fundamental 
principles is applicable to all migratory species within the jurisdiction of a signatory state. 
In contrast to the obligation to take necessary measures to conserve migratory species, are 
signatories not obligated to avoid that a species becomes endangered. This despite the 
acknowledgement of the need take measures to avoid this.380 Neither does the Convention obligate 
signatories to take immediate measures with respect to species listed as endangered.381 This seems 
odd; since there is an immanent risk of extinction when species are listed as endangered. This type 
                                                                                                                                                
377 See Article I (c) (4), CMS.  
378 See Article I (a), CMS.  
379 See Article I (d), CMS.  
380 Article II (2), CMS.  
381 Article II (2) (b), CMS.  
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of substantial rule gaps clearly could have a devastating impact on the survival of a species, this 
as because there is always a delay between the action and the effect. This is obviously not a 
precautionary approach to conservation. Another not clearly regulated matter is whether there is 
any obligation to take steps to avoid a species listed in appendix II from becoming endangered. As 
argued above the obligation would be the one found in the fundamental principle. This, however, 
only outlines that special attention should be given to appendix II species, and does not obligate 
parties to take steps to keep these species of appendix I. 
As shown above, is the focus of the Convention not to contribute to the conservation through its 
own text, but the main purpose is to conclude other agreements to cover this. Some of these 
agreements will be discussed further below. FEEDBACK-­‐SYSTEM  
The Convention text does not contain any formal obligation to submit reports on measures taken, 
as it only outlines that the parties should submit reports.382 However, the term should have been 
interpreted to containing an obligation to provide such reports.383 10.2 SPECIAL  FEATURE  
As mentioned above, the main purpose for the Convention is not to create an overall conservation 
of migratory species through it own text. Instead, it is determined to facilitate the conclusion of 
agreements in favour of conservation and management of these species.384 As a result, to conclude 
agreements under article IV, CMS, can be seen as the cornerstone of the Convention.  
Before discussing these procedures to concluding agreement, differences between the Conventions 
two appendices will be highlighted as the conventions is appendix driven. This means that the 
scope of the convention, to some extend is determined by the migratory species listed in the 
appendices. Appendix I contain species classified as endangered. Appendix II contains species 
being classified as having an unfavourable conservation status.385 Both terms are defined within 
the Convention;386 this will not be address further. As a guideline, only appendix II species can be 
subject to conclusion of agreement under articles IV (3), CMS. 10.2.1  APPENDIX   I      
                                                                                                                                                
382 See Article VI (3), CMS.  
383 Resolution 8.24, CMS/COP-8.  
384 Note 9, Exp. Note, CMS ? 77, 8 June.  
385 Article IV, CMS.  
386 See Article I, CMS.  
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As mentioned above, there are specific obligations related to the species listed in appendix I, 
article III, CMS. An obligation is to prohibit the taking of such species.387 Taking is defined as 
?????????? ????????? ??????????? ??????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? to engage in any such 
conduct.?388 As discussed above, there is no obligation on the parties to provide for immediate 
protections,389 with the possible adverse effect this may have. Another requirement is to inform the 
secretariat of any exceptions granted.390 The rest of article III, CMS, does not contain obligations, 
but rather measure states should strive to take to conserve listed species. One of them will be 
highlighted as it contains a threshold criterion. This is the provision regarding the actions the 
parties must take to make up for ???????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ??????? or prevent the 
???????????????????????????In comparison to WHCs merely criteria, the serious impeding threshold 
of the CMS seems unnecessary high for a non-mandatory provision. 10.2.2  APPENDIX   II   
CMS is like a goose that can lay golden eggs; in itself it is of little value for the conservation of 
migratory species, but treated well the end result can be a valued contribution to the preservation 
of the E?????? biodiversity.  
For species listed in Appendix II, there is a need to conclude agreements in order to oblige 
member states to take measure, as the listing itself does not. This need for agreements has already 
been recognized as of uppermost importance.391 
To be listed in appendix II, a migratory species must either have an unfavourable conservation 
status,392 or a status that would significantly benefit from an international agreement.393 For 
obviously reasons, there is no obligation on the parties to conclude agreements on species listed in 
Appendix II.394 As mentioned above, the agreements must include substantive provisions 
regarding cooperation and coordination of conservation measures to make them binding. 
In order to facilitate the conclusion of agreements the Convention text provides a guideline,395 
which contains provisions and areas that should be covered.396 As mentioned, this guideline only 
                                                                                                                                                
387 Article III (5), CMS, subject to exceptions according to treaty provision.   
388 Article I (i), CMS.  
389 Article II (3) (b), CMS.  
390 Article III (7), CMS.  
391 Resolution 2.6, CMS/COP-2.  
392 See Article I (1) (c) (d), CMS.  
393 See Article IV (1), CMS.  
394 Article IV (2), CMS.  
395 Article V, CMS.  
396 See Appendix I to this thesis.   
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applies to AGREEMENTS concluded under article IV (3), CMS. As a result, agreement concluded 
under article IV (4), CMS, does not have to include the obligatory objectives to restore or maintain 
the species concerned at a favourable conservation status.397 However, there is nothing to prevent 
these provisions to find its way into an article IV (4) agreement. 10.3 ENFORCEMENT,  LIABILITY  AND  DISPUTE  SETTLEMENT  PROCEDURES  
CMS does not contain provisions on liability, which will therefore be governed by the applicable 
sources of international law. Neither does the Convention contain any formal procedures for 
handle non-compliance. Yet by the Rules of Procedures used at COP meetings, there is a 
procedure regarding the payment of subscription.398 Under this procedure, a party loses his right to 
vote at the meeting it they have failed to pay their subscription for at least three consecutive years. 
Exceptions are often given. As for the dispute settlement procedures, disputes shall settle 
amicably.399 If amicable settlement fails, the Convention is not very useful, because it requires 
mutual consent to submit the dispute to arbitration.400 This is clearly a stricter approach than these 
in the above MEAs, also the high politically CBD does not have this restrain. Mutual consent is 
always difficult to get, so to get mutual consent both parties need to find it less costly to go to 
court than to continue the action upon which the conflict arouse. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
397 Article V (1), CMS  
398 See, UN Doc. UNEP/CMS/Conf. 5.4.  
399 Article XIII (1), CMS.  
400 Article XIII (2), CMS.  
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PART  3  ?   ANALYSIS,  SUMMARY  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  
As the author experienced, there is an underlying difficulty of comparing CMS with other 
biodiversity-related MEAs. The difficulty lies mainly in the structural difference. As a main 
difference the CMS does not aim to contribute to the conservation of biodiversity through the 
comprehensive provisions of its text in the same way as other MEAs. CMS has arguable little to 
offer in this context. The cornerstone of CMS is instead the agreements section, where other 
agreements should be concluded and the conservation of biodiversity is dependent on these 
agreements. As a result, CMS seems in comparison with other MEAs as an empty shell 
contributing little to preserve the E?????? biodiversity. The picture is deceptive. The section that 
make it possible for the Convention to conclude other agreement under its aegis are unique and 
super important to CMS contribution to the conservation of biodiversity. 11 CMS  AS  A  BIODIVERSITY  RELATED  TREATY  11.1 THE  GOLDEN  EGG  TO  BE  
For an agreement concluded under the aegis of CMS to be successful in the conservation of 
migratory species, they must meet three conditions;401 
1) A judicial authority in all states within the range of the species need to be 
included;  
2) At a minimum there must be a joint system established for the management of 
the species throughout the whole range; and  
3) An appropriate body must be established to lead the management. 
The first condition includes two aspects: The need to cover the entire range, and the need for a 
responsible nation institute. The former of these is the goal of all agreement concluded under 
CMS. However, this is for obvious reason not a prerequisite for the conclusion of agreements.402 
The latter aspect is always met by the system of appointing national focal points. 
The second condition sets the premise for a minimum level of interaction between the parties, 
repeating the need for a minimum level of interaction thorough the range of the species. The 
cooperation is visible in all agreements complying with the minimum level of interaction. In some 
cases, this cooperation has been extended to coordination. These two concepts will be discussed 
further below. 
                                                                                                                                                
401 See Exp. Note, CMS ? 74.  
402 See Article V (2), CM, which only contains should.  
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The third condition describes the need to establish an appropriate body for managing the specific 
species. According to the Convention text, the function of such a body should be to assist and 
monitor the signatories in their implementation, in order to keep the management in inline with the 
purpose of the singed agreement.403 Since the text of CMS does not provide any further guidance 
to the type of body is the most appropriate, this provision is quite flexible. This flexibility is good 
as every situation and every migratory species are unique, and a type of body established for one 
species may not be appropriate to use in regards to other species. There are some additional 
guidelines for such a body, originating from COP decisions. Under these decisions, the body has 
to be considered the most effective one, at least in terms of economical efficiency, administrative 
efficiency and coordination efficiency.404 
Before giving example of existing bodies in a nearby area of cross-border resource, the difference 
between cooperation and coordination must be solved. 
The difference between cooperation and coordination can be defined by looking at the expected 
results. While cooperation focuses on activities performed by a small number of parties, and 
would ideally lead to a certain result; coordination often involves several parties engaged in 
similar or same type of activities. A key element of coordination is that if any part of the 
concerned action is not performed or performed in a non-effective manner, the parties of the 
coordinating group try to correct this so the purpose for the coordination is achieved. Thus, 
coordination functions with multiple parties. 
Cooperation on the other han??? ??????? ????? ???????????????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ????????????
partners, often a loss in economic efficiency.405 An example of why it becomes less effective in the 
economical side, the risk of double implementation. This often occurs when multiple parties 
undertake the same action. As a result, the overall implementing cost for the combined group of 
cooperating parties is higher than if the actions were coordinated. This is connected to the 
synergies, which are mentioned below. So in order to be regarded as cost-effective some form of 
coordination of activities is required.406 As mentioned, effective coordination requires that the 
                                                                                                                                                
403 Article V (4) (d), CMS.  
404 Resolution 2.7, CMS/COP-2.  
405 This section is based on a working document on coordination and cooperation in the field of viral 
diseases, this however does not result the usefulness of the coordination and cooperation part, Troby. T., HIV 
Coordination in National AIDS Programmes; See <www.troby.eu>.  
406 See Guzman, supra footnote 205, pp. 25-29.  
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parties have an interest in coordinate their actions for the benefit of the target otherwise 
coordination will fail.407 
One prerequisite for successful participation, as well as the subsequent evaluation, is an 
understandable goal. The parties need to know specific reasons why coordination takes place. To 
coordinate actions to preserve a species is not a particularly clear goal, and effectiveness of 
coordination, i.e. its contribution to achieving the goal can not be measured.408 Furthermore, if the 
goal is not clearly specified coordination could be regarded as mere cooperation efforts to reach a 
desirable non-specific target. But as described above, it is possible to measure the effectiveness of 
the coordination of actions to a non-clear target, and this is through the process of 
operationalisation. The coordination must take place within the sub-goals. 
What becomes apparent when dealing with transboundary resources is that coordination must to be 
of the same nature, cross-border. This follows the nature of the covered object, which in fact 
makes coordination measures by one state not an effective method. A good example would be a 
lake where a farmer each year implants loach to maintain a viable population in the lake for the 
purpose of selling fishing licenses. What complicates the issue is a factory located nearby, 
contaminating the lake. As a result, the work of the farmer is not effective way to maintain a 
viable population of loach in the lake. In this example, cooperation would probably be the best 
result as there are only two parties. For more complex situations where multiple states are 
involved, coordination may be preferable. For the benefit of effective coordination, it is arguable 
need for a responsible authority that supports the management of complex matter. But such a body 
must also be invested with the mandate to take actions as well as have the resources to do so.409 
We have already encountered such a body when dealing with CCAMLR. Here the Commission is 
invested with the mandate to regulate the conservation of the biodiversity in the Antarctic 
Southern Ocean. Given the status of the Antarctic Southern Ocean, this study will highlight 
another area dealing with transboundary resources. 
A related area dealing with a cross-border resource is water resources, with reference to Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM) and Integrated River Basin Management.410 Nota Bene this 
                                                                                                                                                
407 Id.  
408 If the goal is measurable there is as mentioned above a need to initially set a lower boundary. 
409 Chayes et al., supra footnote 202, pp. 271-285. 
410 See Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 169-243, especially at pp. 182-192.  
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type of body only works if the parties are willing to coordinate their actions. Coordination is 
therefore dependent on political will rather than the need for effective conservation.411 
Three types of IWRM will be highlighted. The first is a committee or council performing only 
secretariat duties. The second is a commission tasked with planning and resource management. 
The third body is empowered with supervisory authority over the use and management of 
resources.412 CCAMLR Commission would fall into the third category. The third category will not 
be considered further as it currently does not seem a viable strategy for CMS. 
To meet the third condition of the above criteria for an agreement to be viewed as a successful 
agreement, an appropriate body must for a minimum provide for secretariat functions. This may 
not be inline with the goal of an agreement to contribute effectively to the conservation status of 
the E?????????????????????since this approach allows for idiosyncratically approaches at the national 
administrative level. As a result, an appropriate body must have the power to counteract these 
idiosyncratically approach. Thus, as a minimum, this body must have at least a mandate that 
includes planning (structure) and management (activities) of conservation measures. The 
significance is that the planning and structuring are completed on one level. This will 
automatically reduce the idiosyncratic approaches at the administrative levels. Moreover, such a 
body has a better basis for adopting a long-term perspective and taken into account the non-linear 
structure of nature, such as the Commission of CCAMLR does. 
The basic functions of such a body may be different (see table 1). An important feature could be a 
duty to consider all the biodiversity-related MEAs signed by the parties. Obligations under various 
MEAs can then be coordinated to a single management plan. This is not possible if the body is 
simply an administrative body, in which there is no coordination between the various MEAs, but 
only cooperation. In fact, it seems as one of the biggest problems with MEA secretariats is the lack 
of coordination between MEAs,413 and coordination between measures taken at national levels.414 
Furthermore, an approach in which a responsibly body will take into account various MEAs are 
also in favour of a synergistic effect.415 One of the trade-off will be a reduction of costs, as 
opposed to the non-coordinative structures of MEAs.416 For such a trade-off to be possible there 
must be more coordination between existing biodiversity MEAs, and not just only cooperation. 
                                                                                                                                                
411 Troby. T, supra footnote 405 et passim.  
412 See Louka, supra footnote 53, p. 183.  
413 Klemm, supra footnote 355, p. 73.  
414 Behrens, V., Rauchmayer, F., Wittmer., H????????ing international problem species: why pan-European 
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????Environmental Conservation 35 (1) pp. 55-63.    
415 See, Jóhannsdóttir et al., supra footnote 33, p. 145.  
416 Jóhannsdóttir et al., supra footnote 33, pp. 147-148.  
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Furthermore; there will be a synergistic effect on the reduction of the total implementation deficits, 
which is claimed to automatically higher in cooperation in which several administrative levels 
separately interpreting what measures are needed. 
Last but not least, a body of the above type would also be better equipped to take a more holistic 
approach. Into account the more complex issues related to conservation of species, such as 
population growth, poverty and needs of area development, and other millennium goals would 
arguable have a positive effect on the conservation of species. A good example in this area would 
be the Tennessee Valley Authority.417 The reason why such a body would be better equipped is the 
possibility for it to adopt a holistic approach. Where as contemporary MEAs seems to have a 
problem of adopting such an ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
with environmental control measures rather than a holistic approach to environmental 
????????????418 
 
To give an example of loss taking place in cooperation:419 A working program was adopted with a 
long-term vision to restore the pink elephant. The goal of the restoration was a point where 
                                                                                                                                                
417 See Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 182-192.  
418 Management Review of Environmental Governance within the United Nations System, Joint Inspection 
Unit 2008, Doc. JIU/REP/2008/3, especially paras. 22-30.  
419 This example is based on a existing MoU. 
TABLE  1   ESSENTIAL  FUNCTION  FOR  A  WILD  LIFE  AREA  MANAGEMENT  COMISSION  
Plan Formulation of long-term plans for management of wild life and their habitats by 
incorporating principles, such as the precautionary approach but also the need for EIA in 
any project that might have an adverse effect. 
Prioritise measures needed taken covering a proactive mode. 
Coordinate Coordinate obligations and actions deriving from other sources, to minimize duplication of 
actions and costs.  
Monitoring Monitor implementation activities and correct these activities base on continuously 
feedback of information, scientific data by adopting a precautionary approach. 
Resolve conflicts Provide for mechanism for negotiation and litigation in conflicts regarding resources. Not 
only conflict over the right to resources but also such conflict as the losses of livestock to 
predators, where the gain of the predator has to be valued to the lost livestock, not only in 
economical value but also in other values.    
Participation Motivate stakeholders by educate them in the reason of the management needed as well as 
competing reasons, such as economics and sustainable utilization. 
Involve all stakeholders in the planning, managing process. 
Increase public participation and awareness 
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sustainable use can again be envisioned. The overall target was a pink elephant population 
showing an increasing trend, or a halt in their decline over the next five years. To implement the 
goal and the vision, each party were to develop national action plans, after which they were to 
coordinate conservation efforts and promote cooperation between all stakeholders in ranger states. 
In the example above, there are clear visible steps contributing to the implementation deficits. The 
first step is the vision that provides a non-defined point at which the parties can imagine that they 
can start utilising the pink elephant again. The restoration of the pink elephants will aim at this 
point, i.e. it shall not aim to a point where the utilization of the species actually can take place, but 
to a point where the people can start to thinking about it. This vision is clearly vague and therefore 
can never be reached and never evaluated on a scientific basis.420 In order to have some guidelines 
the vision must be materialized into measurable milestones. As described above, this would be 
done through the process of operationalisation. The overall objective can be measured if the 
current population is known. Since there is no reference to a historic level of population the 
starting point must be the current level. The deadline is five years, which means that it is difficult 
to take into account the non-linear behaviour of nature. This makes this approach a reactive rather 
than a proactive approach. 
To meet the objective of the example sub goals are introduced. One of the sub goals is to develop 
a national action plan. This goal is measurable, i.e. it is possible to measure whether the parties 
have developed national plans. But the fulfilment of such a goal says nothing about, if they are 
effective in contributing to the objective of the agreement. In addition, this goal say noting about 
what the action plans shall include, without doubt contributing to the implementation deficit as 
every states administration will have its own agenda. In addition, in this example there is no 
requirement to involve stakeholders in the development of the national action plan, neither in the 
coordination process. The stakeholders are involved in the cooperation process. As a result, if 
cooperation is done at a regional level, and a stakeholder fails to fulfil his task, no one else would 
do it for him, because there is a lack of coordination. This approach will thus ultimately lead to a 
higher degree of implementation deficit. 
The implementation deficit taken place in the example could be counteracted by a responsible 
body with the right mandate, such as the mandate to adopt a comprehensive management where 
coordination is a key aspect, and where monitoring and feedback plays a vital role. 
                                                                                                                                                
420 Disregarding the science of psychoanalysis. 
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11.2 MAKING  OF  GOLDEN  EGGS  
As mentioned, the provisions allowing CMS to conclude agreement is the cornerstone of the 
convention. The realization of the importance of agreements was early recognized, as well as the 
realization of a need to develop exemplary agreements.421 Thus, to facilitate the process of 
conclusion of agreement, an agreement guideline was regarded as an important step, as well as an 
important instrument to clarify different aspects in that process.422 Both the exemplary agreement 
as well as the guide is based on a report423 by the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN).424 As a result, a framework guideline was produced, Guidelines on the Harmonisation of 
Agreements (hereinafter Guideline).425 This Guideline was meant to be a living document that 
would be updated on a regular bases based on the experiences gained from drafting procedures of 
agreements. 
The reason for harmonizing of the agreements is to avoid too many differences in both form and 
effect, which can lead to uncertainty about their scope. Furthermore, too much divergence may 
lead to difficulties to comparing agreements and to obtain an overview over what is regulated and 
what is not, thus increasing the uncertainty over their scope.426 But as a result of a lack of progress, 
the work on the Guideline was eventually stopped,427 and it was never finalized. As a result, it has 
never used to lead the development of MoUs. 
Returning to the various agreements concluded under CMS. These agreements can be based either 
on article IV, paragraphs 3, or paragraph 4. Paragraph 3 is used to conclude AGREEMENT, which 
would be self-standing agreement, such as the Africa-Eurasia Water bird Agreement (AEWA), 
and paragraph 4 is used for other agreements.  
One of the most important differences between these agreements is that AGREEMENTS 
concluded under paragraph 3 usually would have its own secretariat and be self-financing, while 
agreement under paragraph 4 normally would be placed under the chapeaux of UNEP/CMS 
Secretariat.  
                                                                                                                                                
421 Resolution 1.6, CMS/COP-1.  
422 See, CMS/StC.15/Doc 9.2.  
423 Elements for the formulation of guides for the harmonization of future agreements, produced by Cyrille 
de Klemm.  
424 Resolution 4.3, CMS/COP-4.  
425 Doc. CMS/StC.15/Doc.9.2; and Annex, produced by Cyrille de Klemm, International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN).  
426 Resolution 5.2, CMS/COP-5.  
427 See, Report of the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the convention on the conservation 
of migratory species of wild Animal, CMS/COP-7, paras. 174-175.  
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There is also a difference in the obligation to take into account article V, CMS. As discussed 
above, article V is only obligatory for AGREEMENTS. Thus, agreements concluded under article 
IV, paragraph 4 are not required to include an objective in accordance with article V (1); ????
restore the migratory species concerned to a favourable conservation status or to maintain it in 
??????????????? 
Whit regards to article IV, paragraph 4, agreements; CMS divides these agreements into two 
groups, legal binding agreements, and non-legal binding once. What is of outmost importance in 
this aspect is that CMS regards all MoUs concluded as non-legally binding cooperation 
instruments between states.428 As non-legally binding instruments MoU do not contain legally 
binding obligations between the signatories. They do, however, contain official undertaking by the 
signing institution.429 
This thesis will only take a closer look on MoUs. The reason for this is based on what appears to 
be a preference from the CMS of using this type of agreement. Since 2004 there have only been 
two AGREEMENTS,430 while during the same period eleven MoUs have been concluded.431 11.3 MEMORANDUM  OF  UNDERSTANDING  
As they are used by CMS, MoUs are to be regarded as more of administrative instruments to 
facilitate cooperation. Although non-legal instruments between the signatories, it does not mean 
they can not contain measures for implementation of legal commitments.432 It means that they can 
not contain any provisions that require the exercise of political power, but merely undertakings 
that can be implemented through administrative decisions.433 As a result the MoUs may not 
contain provisions like financial provisions to give an annual subscription, as in most cases this 
                                                                                                                                                
428 Memorandum of Understanding are not by definition non-legally binding, the interpretation of if they are 
so has to be in accordance with the Vienna Convention.  
429 See, Introduction at 3 (c), Guidelines on the Harmonization of Agreements, CMS/Stc.15/Doc.9.2 Annex.  
430 The Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels, EIF 1 February 2004; and the Gorilla 
Agreement, supra note 66.  
431 Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the West African Population of 
the African Elephant (Loxodonta africana), EIF 2005; Memorandum of Understanding for the Conservation 
of Ceaceans and their Habitats in the Pacific Islands Region, EIF 2006; See Saiga MoU, supra note?, EIF 
2006; Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Eastern Atlantic population 
of the Mediterranean Monk Seal (Monachus monachus), EIF 2007;Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning Conservation Measures for the Ruddy-headed Goose (Chloephaga rubidiceps), EIF 2006; 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Dugongs (Dugong dugon) and their 
Habitats throughout their Range, EIF 2007; See the Grassland MoU, supra note?, EIF 2007; See the MSC 
MoU, supra note?, EIF 2008; See the Bird of Prey MoU, supra note?, EIF 2008; Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Conservation of High Andean Flamingo and Their Habitats, EIF 2008; and 
Memorandum of Understanding on the conservation of Migratory Sharks, EIF 2010.  
432 See, Introduction at 3 (c), Guidelines on the Harmonization of Agreements, CMS/Stc.15/Doc.9.2 Annex.  
433 Id.  
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would require ratification. A simpler reason why MoUs should not contain these kinds of 
provisions are that MoUs rarely are signed by a person exercising full power of the state, and 
therefore its provisions will not bind the state.434 In contrast to earlier, there is nothing that says 
MoUs can not contain provisions allowing voluntary contributions of the signatory institution.435 
As discussed above, the conclusion of MoU is first and foremost a way to regulate actions in 
regard to a specific species. For this purpose these agreements must be flexible in nature. While 
they must have a clear structure in order to provide a comprehensive picture of what is covered. 
The formulation of an agreement is an art and requires the right knowledge. 
When analysing MoUs concluded under CMS, the following MoUs was covered; The 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane (Grus 
Leucogeranus) (hereinafter the Siberian Crane MoU);436 The Memorandum of Understanding 
Concerning Conservation, Restoration and Sustainable Use of the Saiga Antelope (Saiga tatarica 
tatarica) (Hereinafter the Saiga MoU);437 The Memorandum of Understanding concerning the 
Conservation of the Manatee and Small Cetaceans of West Africa and Micronesia (hereinafter the 
MSC MoU);438 The Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Birds of 
Prey in Africa and Eurasia (hereinafter Bird of Prey MoU);439 and  The Memorandum of 
understanding on the Conservation of Southern South America Migratory Grassland Bird Species 
and Their Habitats (hereinafter the Grassland Birds MoU).440 
By looking into the MoUs, they more or less contain elements contained that are in the above-
mentioned Guideline.441 An important difference is the definition of terms, which only the Bird of 
Prey MoU contains. But more interesting are the differences in design, placement of provisions 
and their scope, i.e. the scope of the provisions. The number of provision and their volume of them 
differ from eight to 31. The numbers of paragraphs used are five to 22. Nota Bene, this does not 
                                                                                                                                                
434 See particularly article 7 and 8 Vienna Convention.  
435 See at, Guidelines for Memorandum of Understanding, Guidelines on the Harmonization of Agreements, 
CMS/Stc.15/Doc.9.2 Annex.  
436 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian Crane (Grus 
Leucogeranus), EIF 1 January 1999.   
437 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation, Restoration and Sustainable Use of the Saiga 
Antelope (Saiga tatarica tatarica), EIF 24 September 2006.  
438 Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Conservation of the Manatee and Small Cetaceans of 
West Africa and Micronesian, EIF 3 October 2008.  
439 Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation of Migratory Birds of Prey in Africa and Eurasia, 
EIF 1 November 2008.   
440 Memorandum of understanding on the Conservation of Southern South America Migratory Grassland 
Bird Species and Their Habitats (hereinafter the Grassland Birds MoU), EIF 26 August 2007.   
441 The content are; Preamble; Definition; Focal Points; National Report; Exchange of information; 
Cooperation mechanism; Monitoring; Conservation/Action Plan; Duration; Amendment; EIF, Denunciations; 
Depositary.  
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say so anything about the content. As each MoU requires specific content they would always be 
different, containing different amount of provisions, of different size. Yet it is here the difficulties 
arise. As a result of the difference in the overall structures of the texts, it is difficult to see if they 
follow the same pattern. It also makes it difficult to get an overview of what is actually regulated. 
What are the basic provisions and what is unique in relation to the specific MoU. This may 
eventually become an obstacle in the progressive development of effective MoUs. Recognising 
this is important as it is by developing agreements CMS contribution to the conservation of 
biodiversity can be increased. 11.4 MOU  IMPLEMENTATION  DEFICITS     
The importance or impact MoUs can play and have on the conservation status of biodiversity can 
be illustrated thought the process of implementation deficit. The illustration of the process must be 
expanded to understand how MoUs can affect the implementation deficit. This is due to the fact 
that there are two legislative processes in play. The first one was the process of concluding CMS; 
the other is when CMS concludes agreements under its aegis. Both these processes need to be 
accounted for. This can be illustrated as follows:  
 
The large gap between the goal of sustainable development and CMS depends on the changes 
made in the negotiation process, in which the joint sovereignty was removed. This is not such a 
big problem because it is first and foremost, not CMS, which is to conserve migratory species, but 
the agreements concluded under it. As mentioned, this is the uniqueness that gives CMS advantage 
over other MEAS, where the party obligation depends on the text and there must be an amended 
procedure in order to change these obligations. So, if handled correctly the MoUs concluded under 
Total
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CMS does not suffer from the amendment problem of ratification. However, this requires more 
efforts in the process of concluding effective agreements by putting the obligations of the official 
undertaking above the obligations deriving from the text of CMS. This would in line with the 
theory of overloading442 reduce the implementation deficit,443 which would lead to a higher end-
result. This process is illustrated below. 
 
The reduction of the implementation deficit comes from the fact that the daughter agreements 
contain stringent substantive rules than CMS. Such rules could be an obligation to undertake an 
EIA according to the CBD, if the party are bound by that convention. This would not be an 
unreasonable requirement as parties to CBD already are required to do so. If the daughter 
agreement does not contain stringent substantive rules then the deficit would be inline with the 
previous figures. However, there is not only a need to put more stringent substantive rules in a 
daughter agreement, both the goals and the type of actions and measures are required to achieve 
the goal must be clarified. A good example would be the Saiga MoU. The Saiga MoU is also the 
only MoU taken into account, which takes into account the inter-generation equity as well as the 
responsibility present generation have for future once. Another example would be the MSC MoU, 
who mentioned the cultural value of the manatees and the small cetaceans, but only in the relation 
to the living communities. As a result, other MoUs is not considered agreements inline with the 
                                                                                                                                                
442 See Above section 2.4.  
443 However the reduction of the implementation deficit would not be linear with the improvement placed in 
the substantive rules.  
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principle of sustainable development because they do not take into account inter-generation 
equity.444 11.5 SUMMARY  
This completes the analysis of the covered biodiversity-related agreements. The analysis shows a 
wide range of strategies for dealing with conservation of various types of biodiversity. While it 
shows that there is an underlying structure in which the approach to biodiversity conservation 
must be based on the precautionary principle where the lack of scientific data should not prevent 
states from taking actions. This is important because there seems to be recognised that scientific 
information is only one type of information to take into account, the other being unknown and 
therefore the precautionary principle. 
More important, it demonstrates the need for a coordinated approach, rather than a cooperative 
approach. This is apparent throughout the documents, which includes systems that are not limited 
to a national jurisdiction. On the other hand, WCH shows the need to cooperate when dealing with 
issues enclosed within the jurisdiction of a state. 
All the covered instruments are unique in some sense. CCAMLR is unique in the sense that it 
covers areas beyond national jurisdiction. This makes it possible to have a commission with a 
strong mandate to deal with the conservation of the resources in the area. Ramsar is unique 
covering one of the most important ecosystems, which have a variety of functions, not only as a 
waterfowl habitat but also to the economy of local communities. Despite the importance wetlands 
play in the global ecosystems, it is up to states to manage them. The contribution of Ramsar is first 
and foremost through the development of the concept of wise use.  
CBD is probably the UNCLOS of the land, covering all areas not covered by a specific agreement. 
It???probably the future for the protection of biodiversity at the global level. The number of parties 
to the convention shows that it is a politically important convention to sign. The future extent of it 
will be to take further steps to embrace the contemporary patchwork of the biodiversity-related 
agreements.  
CMS on the other hand, has an important role has an important role in the conservation of 
biodiversity not contained within one jurisdiction. CMS also stands out as its main purpose is to 
conclude agreements in order to effectively contribute to the conservation of the E???????
                                                                                                                                                
444 See Above section 2.1.  
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biodiversity. For this purpose, the last section will give concrete proposals to CMS based on the 
above analysis. 12 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Every legal documents need to be reassessed once and a while. The context in which they work is 
changing, and the ways in how to deal with the objects they cover. This analysis has showed that 
this becomes especially clear in the filed of nature conservation. CMS does, as one of the older 
biodiversity-related convention, suffer from its pre-Rio status. Principles that now more or less are 
takes for granted when approaching biodiversity conservation is lacking. Principles as the 
precautionary principle, the inter-generation equity, and the requirement to conduct an EIA, are 
not clearly present in the text. As principles and methods play an increasingly important part in the 
contemporary management of biodiversity this section will give propose to CMS how they can 
increase their contribution to the preservation of the E??????? ?????????????? ???? proposals in this 
section are based on the analysis in the previous parts, and take into consideration the often 
difficult financial situation most MEA secretariat faces. 12.1.1  RECOMMENDATION  1  
As mentioned, the main aims of CMS are to serve as a framework convention allowing stand-
alone Agreements to be concluded under its aegis, and as an umbrella convention for the 
conclusion of Memorandum of Understanding. Both types of agreements aim to conserve 
migratory species, there are, however, vast differences between them. One of the major differences 
is their legal status. Agreements are legally binding and contain obligations, MoUs on the other 
hand, are regarded as non-legally binding instruments and without legal obligations, but as 
discusses above, they do contain official commitments by the signed institution. Despite this CMS 
seems to prefer to work with MoUs. However there seems to be no structural approach in the 
preparation of these. This is opposite to the approach taken by WCH, which has adopted a 
standard agreement to facilitate the process of concluding agreements. These documents adopted 
by WCH is not static, they are adoptive to the particular situation and circumstances, but brings a 
basic structure. 
With regards to MoU produced under the aegis of CMS, it is at first not easy to get a 
comprehensive overview, referring both to specific texts, but also to the content. Secondly, it is 
unclear whether there is a coordination system in place between the MoUs, with reference to 
coordination at secretariat level. Implementation deficits may thus take place at least as follows: 
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(a) Although a MoU will be evaluated as effective, when it come to conservation of 
migratory species, there will be difficulty to compare that MoU with others, in order to 
improving other and future MoUs. One reason is the difference in structure and content. 
Obviously the content of a text cannot be the same in every situation as each context is 
unique. The structure, however, could be similar in order to make it easier to get an 
overview of how each MoU addresses conservation in their special case. A clearer 
distinction between general and specific provisions, relating to specific animals, would 
have this clarifying effect. A clear structure would also contribute to a reduction in the 
overall implementation deficit, which takes place in all MoUs, because it would help to 
correct these instruments at party meetings, according to feedback. The response data 
referred to here is not only the feedback information received in relation to specific MoUs 
but also feedback gained from other MoU. For this to be possible coordination must take 
place at the secretariat level. 
(b) The second implementation losses occur as a result of the lack of coordination between 
the personal responsible for each specific MoU. The losses come from an error in the 
feedback system, resulting in the losses of feedback. This loss leads to decreased ability 
to take care of the information available, which may play an important part in 
strengthening the preservation contribution of the MoU. 
(c) As a result of the losses of information, there will not be an effective improvement 
enhancement in future MoUs. In this case there is a risk for new MoUs to be based upon 
the MoU, which is considered to be the best working MoU, though this MoU may contain 
bad parts. As a result, good parts in otherwise poorly functional MoUs are disregarded. 
 
 
Recommendation  1  
For  the  purpose  of  streamline  the  process  of  concluding  MoU  the  secretariat  should  continue  
the  work  on  the  Guideline  for  Agreement.  The  main  focus  of  this  work  has  to  be  MoUs,  rather  
than  Agreements,  as  MoUs  seems  to  be  the  focus  area.     
The  process  of  formulating  a  guideline  has  to  be  an  ongoing  process,  where  feedback  
information  as  mentioned  has  to  result  in  the  improvement  of  the  guideline.       
Recommendation  1.1  
Enhance  the  cooperation  and  coordination  at  secretariat  level  between  personal  responsible  for   
the  different  MoUs.  This  in  order  to  better  exchange  feedback  information,  and  discuss  the  
future  shapes  of  MoUs,  whether  or  not  these  should  cover  specific  animals  or  specific  hinders.   
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12.1.2  RECOMMENDATION  2  
CMS is, as described above, special in comparison with other biodiversity-related MEA. First of 
all, there is a difference in the approach CMS takes to contribute to the conservation of the E?????? 
biodiversity. While CMS is to contribute by concluding other agreement, other MEAs are to 
contribute through the substantial rules of their own treaty text; this has two impacts on the 
conclusion process of MoUs. First, MoUs must provide better substantive rules, and not just 
procedural rules, than the text of CMS. Secondly, when CMS focus on concluding MoUs focus 
must be to make each new MoU better than the previous once. To do this process every time, 
however, is time consuming, thus the above recommendation to conclude the Guideline for 
Agreement, in order to streamline the process of MoU conclusion. The process of improving the 
agreement seems to work in the event of legally binding agreements, such as AEWA and 
EUROBATS. Regardless of why it does not work on the MoU is due to the lack of legal 
knowledge, of a non-effective dissemination of information form other MoUs or administrative 
reasons are difficult o say and require further analysis. 
With particular regards to the MoUs there also seems to be a lack of reassessment if it is necessary 
to continue along the path. For example, there are no sunset clauses, and few of the MoU includes 
an assessment of whether the cooperation is to be terminated. The purpose of this reassessment is 
to see if the MoU has the desirable effect for which it was introduced, or if the cooperation shall 
be suspended so as not to draw vital resources away from other more potential viable projects of 
cooperation and coordination. In this aspect, the way CMS uses MoU has potential side effect for 
parties to CMS. This is due to the following. As the MoUs does not require ratification, they can 
not contain subscription rules. Thereby, the signatories of a MoU do not contribute to the 
operational cost of the MoU. As a result, resources invested in MoUs by the secretariat of CMS 
draws resources away from measures that should have been in favour of CMS parties.445 That is 
also why a MoU should be possible to terminate if it is not regarded to be affective in contributing 
to the preservation of migratory species. In this case, there must be a function where the secretariat 
is able to stop providing the secretariat function. 
Furthermore, as a result of MoUs being signed also by non-CMS members, and the often lack of 
connections to the text of CMS, there is a risk in loosing important aspects of CMS. One aspect 
would be the inter-generation equity, which is in the preamble of CMS. This principle is as 
mentioned above, important as agreement that does not take into account the principle of inter-
generation equity is not in line with the principle of sustainable development, as the inter-
                                                                                                                                                
445 See, for example, Saiga MoU, which contains two CMS parties and two non-CMS parties. 
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generation equity is a core principle within that principle. As a result, most MoUs concluded under 
the aegis of CMS can not be seen as an instrument that contributes to sustainable development. It 
must be remembered that although the non-legally binding nature MoUs stand alone as binding 
agreements of formal commitments. It is therefore important to connect these commitments to 
important international principles, such as sustainable development and inter-generation equity. 
While it can be argued that a MoU concluded under the aegis of CMS which does not take into 
consideration the total scope of the convention, where the total scope will be the text, the aim and 
objectives, as well as the preamble, can not be seen as a MoU under the convention. It can rather 
be regarded as a MoU concluded under the aegis of the UNEP/CMS Secretariat, where the 
secretariat is only a contractual part assuming the obligation to provide secretarial services. This 
follows form the obligation of a treaty organ to work according to the vision, aim and objective of 
its convention. This obligation to work within the frames of its convention is based on the fact that 
the ????????????? for the UNEP/CMS Secretariats is the text of the convention.446 As a result, for 
the UNEP/CMS Secretariat not to take into account the full scope of the convention would 
therefore not be inline with their obligations as an organ of that convention. A side effect of not 
doing so is that the secretariat is contributing to the implementation losses. It follows from the 
above, as self-standing agreements, not connection to the text of CMS, the CMS/COP resolutions 
and decisions do not have an impact on the MoUs. 
                                                                                                                                                
446 Chayes et al., supra footnote 202, pp. 274-275. 
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 12.1.3  RECOMMENDATION  3  
Formal non-compliance procedures are not common in international treaties and this thesis has 
shown that they are even more scares within biodiversity-related MEAs. A good example where 
they exist would be the Aarhus Convention, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change,447 CITES, and the Bern Convention for the Conservation of 
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern convention).448  
According to the Bern convention the secretariat has the possibilities to initiate an investigation 
into allegations of non-compliance and inform the COP.449This procedure has a shame and blame 
function, where the non-complying state has to answer for their disobedience at party meetings. 
Also as mentioned, there are steps taken in the Cartagena protocol to establish a formal non-
compliance procedure, by adopting a procedure for the decision-making body of the protocol to 
take measures to address non-compliance. Given the nature and extent of the Cartagena protocol 
there are limits to the possibilities of drawing conclusions in order to evaluate whether such a 
procedure would be appropriate for CMS. In the case of CITES, their enforcement is largely 
                                                                                                                                                
447 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 11 December 
1977, EIF 16 February 2005, U.N.T.S. Vol. 2303, p. 148 (Kyoto Protocol).  
448 Bern Convention for the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Bern, September 
1979, EIF 1 June 1982, (Bern Convention); available at  
 <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/default_en.asp>. 
449 Louka, supra footnote 53, pp. 126-129.  
Recommendation  2  
The  MoU  must  contain  stricter  substantive  provisions  than  CMS.  These  provisions  also  should  be  
more  detailed,  for  example  as  in  the  Supplementary  Nagoya  Protocol.   
Recommendation  2.1  
The  secretariat  should  consult  legal  knowledge  in  the  field  of  international  environmental  law  
with  knowledge  of  sustainable  development  when  concluding  MoUs.   
Recommendation  2.2  
The  secretariat  should  establish  an  internal  review  mechanism  to  ensure  so  each  MoU  are  in  
line  with  the  overall  goal  of  the  convention.   
Recommendation  2.3  
The  Inter-­‐generation  equity  should  be  incorporated  into  the  MoU  to  enable  them  to  be  truly  
agreement  for  sustainable  development.   
Recommendation  2.4  
The  Secretariat  should  consider  including  some  kind  of  termination  clause  in  MoUs.   
Part  three    
 
linked to the presence of state borders, where actions can be taken, this would therefore not be a 
good example for CMS. 
As shown in the above analysis, enforcement within the field of biodiversity has to take place at 
the national level, and by the national legal system, to be effective. This is the result of how MEA 
works, where implementation to preserve species must take place at national level. Therefore, 
enforcement should be on the same level. In addition, following the principle of sovereignty, a 
state can not be forced to comply by means other than peacefully means. Thus, if the available 
means are not sufficient incentive to change the behaviour of the non-complying state, and the cost 
of non-compliance is less than the cost of compliance, compliance will take place to a lesser 
degree.450 
The case is further complicated by the way CMS works. By using non-legally binding agreement 
there obligation to follow then, in relation to other signatories, is nil. Therefore, there is nothing to 
enforce. As a result of the difference between CMS and other MEAs, a comparison of compliance 
and enforcement regimes between these instruments, is not be worth the effort. This is due to a 
proposal for enforcement procedure for CMS would only have an effect in term of CMS, and the 
few obligations it contain. Therefore, the question is if enforcement procedures are an adequate 
way to address the problem with non-compliance of CMS and associated instruments. It would be 
better to focus on improving these instruments and to find ways to facilitate their implementation. 
One way would be to make it more clear what to do. To improve the conservation status will only 
be clear if the text defines what this means.  
Another way to improve them would be to make the undertakings a part of the corpus of national 
law, such as the approach taken by the supplementary Nagoya protocol. This is possible because, 
according to the signing of the responsible institution, the official undertakings will eventually 
results in duties of national stakeholders. This obligation is the result of actions taken as a result of 
the signed MoU. An example of such obligation can be the obligation not to hunt a specific 
animal. On the other hand, as a consequence of the existence of obligation follows that there is a 
right, and these rights must be enforceable within the national state. This was the case in the 
Lagoon of Lac Bay case, where non-legally binding documents resulted in obligations and rights. 
In this case the right for the state to require an EIA, and the requirement for a stakeholder to 
perform one. The need to include these undertakings within the corpus of obligations of the 
signing institution opens an opportunity for an entity, with the correct legal position to enforce this 
                                                                                                                                                
450 See Guzman, supra footnote 205, et passim, particularly pp. 119-126 and 150-153.  
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undertaking at the national level, which would undoubtedly have a significant positive effect on 
the reduction of implementation deficit, and the conservation of migratory species. This is the idea 
behind the Aarhus convention. As a result, would the incorporation of these undertaking within the 
corpus of national law as a viable step in the contribution to preserve the E?????????????????????This 
could not take place if the undertakings are without meaning at the national level. 
 12.1.4  RECOMMENDATION  4  
As the nature of migratory species i transboundary, it follows from the above that states have a 
responsibilities when managing them, both when it comes to utilization and management. 
Obligations under the CMS are primarily linked to the text of the convention, as discussed above 
the preamble is more of a source of interpretation of treaty obligation. Thus giving the absence of 
the wise use of the term in the treaty text gives some what an illusory picture over the scope of the 
Convention. Despite the absence of the wise use, the purpose of the convention is primarily not to 
completely ban the utilization of these species, but to preserve them for the benefit of present and 
future generations. The same can be said of the MoUs. On the other hand, as a species never has 
been delisted from one of the appendices the scope of the conventions seems to be of a more 
protective convention. Meanwhile, the non-delisting of species can be an answer to the initial 
Recommendation  3  
CMS  should  change  and  streamline  the  way  they  approach  their  purpose,  this  as  a  result  of  the  
major  differences  between  CMS  and  other  MEAs.  This  difference  must  be  reflected  in  the  way  
CMS  works.  
Recommendation  3.1  
Focus  of  CMS  work  should  be  on  the  agreement  concluded  under  its  aegis.   
Recommendation  3.2  
Incorporate  provisions  so  the  official  undertakings  in  the  signed  MoU  are  applicable  to  national  
law  and  legislation,  such  as  has  been  done  in  the  Supplementary  Nagoya  Protocol.  The  Aarhus  
convention  would  be  a  good  place  to  start.   
Recommendation  3.3  
For  the  above  purposes  a  Review  Body  should  be  established  to  evaluate  CMS.   
Recommendation  3.4  
More  clearly  incorporate  public  participation,  as  the  public  play,  especially  in  the  field  of  
biodiversity  protection,  a  key  role.  A  reference  to  the  Aarhus  Convention  would  make  a  
significant  contribution  to  this.   
Part  three    
 
question concerning the MEAs in general, and especially CMS, effectively contribute to 
preserving E?????? biodiversity. 
As shown in the Ramsar convention, the concept of wise use plays an important role in the 
preservation of wetlands, this by imposing more stringent obligations on the parties, such as the 
obligation to conduct an EIA. As mentioned, the concept of wise use as it is incorporated into 
CMS is more of a political statement reminding the parties to utilize these resources in a 
sustainable way, not obligating parties to do so. This is not a strong base on which CMS could put 
further obligation on the parties by COP decisions. Sustainable use may be interpreted as the set of 
customary international customary law, based upon the many instruments containing this 
provision, and the fact that a large number of states take this into consider in their utilization. 
CMS is not without foundation for additional obligations. A strong foundation for obligations to 
introduce stronger measures to conserve migratory species is the concept of sustainable wildlife 
management. This concept is as discussed above a broader concept then sustainable uses, and 
includes both the principles of inter- and intra-generation equity, as well as sustainable use. 
Connecting this to the fundamental principle of CMS there is a case. In the fundamental principle 
parties agree to take action individually or jointly, in order to conserve migratory species with an 
unfavourable status and their habitats.451 As a result, unless the parties apply a sustainable wildlife 
management to migratory species, and their habitat, the status of these will automatically be 
unfavourable, and the parties are obligated to take actions.452 What complicates the matter is the 
definition of the term wise wildlife management, which is neither defined in the convention text or 
COP document. This opens up for idiosyncratic approaches at administrative level when this term 
will be defined, if at all regarded.453 To reduce the idiosyncratic approach to this concept the term 
must be defined. Whether it contains, or should be considered including the basis for the 
obligations to carry out an EIA, or to adopt a precautionary approach when it developed areas and 
habitats important for migratory species, is not within the scope of this study to say. This is within 
the mandate of Scientific Council.454 Despite this, by analysing the MEAS in this study, it 
becomes clear that the precautionary principle and the ecosystem approach is an intergraded part 
of a sustainable wildlife management, as sustainable wildlife management may not take place if 
there is no precautionary approach, and no consideration of the eco-system. 
                                                                                                                                                
451 Article II (1), CMS.  
452 See Article I (c) (4) and (d), CMS.  
453 Strangely the term seems to be disregarded at any level, national or other.  
454 See Resolution 1.4, para. 6 (b) CMS/COP-1, where the Scientific Council is given the mandate to ?????
formulate guidelines for the application of s???? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????????? ???? ???????????
?????????. The word such does not confine the mandate of the Scientific Council to formulate guidelines of 
the two mentioned terms.  
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Recommendation  4  
The  Scientific  Council  should  define  the  term  and  formulate  guidelines  for  the  application  of   
wise  wildlife  management.   In  any  definition  and  guideline  of  this  term  the  total  scope  of  the  
convention  should  to  be  taken  into  account,  incorporating  both  vital  parts  of  the  preamble  as  
well  as  international  principles.  The  obligation  to  take  these  into  account  follows  from  the  
theory  of  ?????????????,  as  mentioned  above.  
Recommendation  4.1  
More  clearly  incorporate  into  MoU  international  principles  used  in  other  MEAs,  such  as  the  
precautionary  approach,  and  the  eco-­‐system  approach,  since  they  play  vital  parts  in  
conservation  as  well  as  they  are  a  prerequisite  to  lead  to  sustainable  development.   
Recommendation  4.2  
As  a  result  of  migratory  species  being  of  a  transboundary  nature  CMS  needs  to  be  the  
connecting  hub  when  concluding  agreements.  Therefore  MoU  should  contain  reference  to  other  
MEAs  signed  by  are  parties.   
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APPENDIX  1  
Article V 
Guidelines for AGREEMENTS 
1. The object of each AGREEMENT shall be to restore the migratory species concerned to a favourable 
conservation status or to maintain it in such a status. Each Agre ement should deal with these aspects of the 
conservation and management of the migratory species concerned which serve to achieve that object.  
   
2. Each AGREEMENT should cover the whole of the range of the migratory species concerned and should be 
open to accession by all Range States of that species, whether they are Parties to this Convention.  
   
3. An AGREEMENT should, wherever possible, deal with more than one migratory species.  
   
4. Each AGREEMENT should:  
a) identify the migratory species covered ;  
b) describe the range and migration route of the migratory species;  
c) provide for each Party to designate its national authority concerned with the implementation of the 
AGREEMENT.  
d) establish, if necessary, appropriate machinery to assist in carryi ng out the aims of the 
AGREEMENT, to monitor its effectiveness, and to prepare reports for the Conference of the Parties;  
e) provide for procedures for the settlement of disputes between Parties to the AGREEMENT; and  
f) at a minimum, prohibit, in relation to a migratory species of the Order Cetacea, any taking that is 
not permitted for that migratory species under any other multilateral Agreement and provide for 
accession to the AGREEMENT by States that are not Range States of that migratory species.  
   
5. Where appropriate and feasible, each AGREEMENT should provide for but not be limited to:  
 a) periodic review of the conservation status of the migratory species concerned and the identification 
of the factors which may be harmful to that status;  
b) co-ordinated conservation and management plans;  
c) research into the ecology and population dynamics of the migratory species concerned, with special 
regard to migration;  
d) the exchange of information on the migratory species concerned, special regard bei ng paid to the 
exchange of the results of research and of relevant statistics;  
e) conservation and, where required and feasible, restoration of the habitats of importance in 
maintaining a favourable conservation status, and protection of such habitats fro m disturbances, 
including strict control of the introduction of, or control of already introduced, exotic species 
detrimental to the migratory species;  
f) maintenance of a network of suitable habitats appropriately disposed in relation to the migration 
routes;  
g) where it appears desirable, the provision of new habitats favourable to the migratory species or 
reintroduction of the migratory species into favourable habitats;  
h) elimination of, to the maximum extent possible, or compensation for activities and obstacles which 
hinder or impede migration;  
i) prevention, reduction or control of the release into the habitat of the migratory species of substances 
harmful to that migratory species;  
j) measures based on sound ecological principles to control and manage the taking of the migratory 
species;  
k) procedures for co-ordinating action to suppress illegal taking;  
l) exchange of information on substantial threats to the migratory species;  
m) emergency procedures whereby conservation action would be consi derably and rapidly 
strengthened when the conservation status of the migratory species is seriously affected; and  
n) making the general public aware of the contents and aims of the AGREEMENT. 
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